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ABSTRACT

This paper examines Cold War influences on early post-World War II
presidential elections, Barry M. Goldwater's rise to Republican presidential
nominee, and the contribution of foreign policy issues to the Arizonan's defeat
in the 1964 presidential election. W orld War II and the Cold W ar increased the
importance of foreign policy considerations in presidential elections, and from
1948 through 1964, every major party nominee advocated the militant
containment of communism. Goldwater was an ardent Cold Warrior, who had
developed staunch convictions on domestic and foreign matters. As a senator,
his unwavering conservatism cast him as a "maverick" among other
Republicans; however, in 1964 the GOP right wing dominated state and local
party machinery and the increasingly popular Arizonan captured the
presidential nomination. The margin of Goldwater's overwhelming election
defeat was due largely to the public's perception of him as an impulsive radical
who would senselessly risk nuclear confrontation in the Cold War. This grossly
unfavorable perception was propagated by the senator's numerous Republican
and Democratic critics, although Goldwater, himself, bore significant
responsibility for the image.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1960s the United States was approaching its zenith as the
dominant world power. The nation's post-World War II economic boom
provided Americans w ith unparalleled prosperity and enabled its government
to operate a global m ilitary defense network. The economy of Western Europe
had recovered rapidly from its wartime destruction w ith substantial U.S. aid,
and the region's governing democratic principles had remained generally intact.
Correspondingly, America's new rival power, the communist governed Soviet
Union, lagged behind the West's sweeping economic modernization. By 1963
Russia had achieved remarkable military advancements, including a rapidly
expanding atomic arsenal, but Moscow suffered from a major defeat in the
"Cold War" against the West when it was forced to w ithdraw nuclear missiles
from the Caribbean island of Cuba. Despite occasions of detente, such as the
limited nuclear test ban accord, the two superpowers engaged in inflammatory
geopolitics and an ominous weapons race.
Momentous w orld events, such as the Soviet Union's domination over
Eastern Europe (1944-48), the rise of China's communist government (1949),
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communist North Korea's invasion of South Korea (1950), Moscow's forceful
suppression of Eastern European revolutionaries (1956), the Soviet Union's
Sputnik satellite launch (1957), and Cuba's alliance w ith the Soviet Union
(1961), caused the leaders of United States and Western Europe to fear the
encroachment of communism. Consequently, perfervid anti-communist
philosophy and policy came to govern American society and led to a "Red
Scare" in the 1940s and 1950s. And, despite the passing of McCarthyism and
even the death of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy in 1957, a generally bipartisan,
militant anti-communist foreign policy continued to dominate Washington.
Influential leaders in the United States equated Joseph Stalin's postwar
totalitarianism w ith the evils of Adolph Hitler's imperialism and consequently,
there was minimal domestic opposition to emerging foreign policies designed
to "contain" the spread of international communism. Containment policy was
manifested in 1947 w ith the Truman Doctrine pledge that "It must be the
policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures."’ The United States
assured Western Europe's security w ith the implementation of the Marshall
Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, w hile other non-communist
nations such as Greece, Turkey, Israel, South Korea and Vietnam benefitted
from foreign aid programs and regional collective security agreements.

’John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National
Securitv Policv (New York, 1982), 22.
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America's preoccupation with fighting the spread of communism
significantly influenced domestic politics. O nly once did a well known
presidential candidate, Henry Wallace, openly advocate cooperation with the
Soviet Union, and he failed to w in a single electoral vote in the 1948 election.
Other presidential candidates, including Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, all
subscribed to historical lessons derived from the 1930s including the
importance of m ilitary preparedness and the avoidance of diplomatic
appeasement. Most leaders, from what historian Thomas G. Paterson has called
the "cold war generation," believed that the massive troop demobilization,
weapons disarmament, and political isolationism of the industrialized nations
after W orld War I directly encouraged German and Japanese aggression.
Further, Nazi belligerence in the thirties exposed the pitfalls of "soft"
diplomacy: that "aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and
unchallenged, ultimately leads to war."^
After 1948 every major party U.S. presidential nominee systematically
sought to emphasize his Cold War credentials and promised to execute a
"more effective" anti-communist foreign policy. For eight years in the 1950s,
Americans intrusted their foreign relations to a career m ilitary officer. General
Dwight D. Eisenhower. The extremely close presidential election of 1960,
between Richard M. Nixon and John F. Kennedy, demonstrated the "ingrained

^Thomas G. Paterson, "Bearing the Burden: A Critical Look At JFK's Foreign Policy," The Virginia
Quarterlv Review. 54 (Spring 1978): 199.
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nature" of Cold War history as the candidates shared similar views on foreign
affairs w ith both calling for "victory" over international com m unism / But just
four years later, the Democratic Party's overwhelming presidential triumph gave
the appearance of national consensus on domestic and international platforms
of a single candidate. Although the incumbent President, Lyndon Johnson, was
likely to defeat any opponent in 1964, his landslide margin of victory, which
resulted largely from his posturing on defense and foreign policy, was neither
predictable nor inevitable. Still distraught by the November 1963 Kennedy
assassination, the American people were unlikely to condone the election of a
third different president w ithin a mere twelve month period. However, the
1964 campaign possessed the potential for a meaningful debate of issues and
ideology that had been noticeably absent in the Kennedy-Nixon contest. At the
core of the candidates' differences were w idely varying interpretations over the
role of the federal government. Their positions on civil rights, fiscal policy, and
federal spending programs, all posed legitimate differences from w hich voters
could choose. The Republican challenger, Barry Goldwater, promised "A
Choice Not An Echo." Ironically however, it was the candidates' perceived
differences in foreign affairs - - an area in which the tw o candidates probably
shared the most basic if unspoken commonality - - that ended up being one of
the most decisive campaign issues.
Lyndon Johnson's crushing victory resulted from the public's negative

^Paterson, "Bearing the Burden," 199.
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perception o f his opponent: an alleged reactionary, w ho opposed popular
federal spending programs; a reputed racist, w ho opposed civil rights; and an
ostensible foreign policy militant, who advocated nuclear wars. Goldwater,
himself, bore significant responsibility for this irreparable image. His adherence
to and outspoken support of conservative political ideology, his fervent anti
communism, his advocacy of limited wars and nuclear testing, and his
impetuous and sometimes careless speaking manner, all contributed to this
unfavorable portrait. But both the Democratic Party and Goldwater's
Republican critics vehemently promoted this negative characterization by
capitalizing on his verbal blunders and distorting and exaggerating his positions
on numerous domestic and international issues.
O f the many factors that contributed to the "Goldwater image," the
lingering impression of a foreign policy extremist proved the most damaging to
his campaign. The country's escalating commitment to Southeast Asia, capped
by Johnson's August 1964 retaliatory bombing of North Vietnam, served to
heighten the importance of foreign affairs leadership during the election.
Goldwater's bellicose Cold War rhetoric amplified voter apprehension
regarding U.S. involvement in either limited or unrestricted warfare. Although
continuing involvement in Southeast Asia allowed Goldwater to criticize
Kennedy-Johnson policies, the Vietnam issue also enabled Johnson and others
to perpetuate the expanding representation of Goldwater as a presidential
candidate who would risk nuclear war to halt the spread of communism.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

6

Analysis of 1964 presidential campaign could easily be reduced to a study
of contrasts. Nowhere were the stark contrasts of the 1964 campaign more
evident than in the comparison of the nominees themselves. Barry Goldwater
was a popular conservative idealist w ith relatively limited political expertise,
whereas Lyndon Johnson was a pragmatic and masterful career politician. In
retrospect, it is clear that the Arizonan wanted to debate ideological principles
and the Texan wanted to become president. Significant leads in early public
opinion polls and general Democratic Party unity enabled Johnson to
concentrate on presidential duties early in the year and run a low key
incumbent campaign. His challenger, w ho planned an exhaustive assault style
strategy, quickly found himself on the defensive in the Republican primaries,
fending off attacks from GOP moderates and liberals. The serious wounds
suffered by Goldwater during the first half of the year were never allowed to
heal. The Democrats capitalized on the Republicans' bruising treatment of their
own nominee and embarked upon a relentless attack on Goldwater. Unlike the
presidential election of 1952, the last time the GOP faced an incumbent
Democratic Party, Goldwater was never able to mount a decisive offensive
against Lyndon Johnson. This paper seeks to review how the Cold War
influenced early post-World War II presidential elections, Barry Goldwater's
rise to Republican presidential nominee, and the contribution of foreign policy
issues to the Arizonan's landslide defeat in the 1964 presidential election.
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CHAPTER 2

THE COLD WAR CONTEXT, 1945-1963

By the early 1960s the United States's tenure as a w orld power
approached what historian Thomas J. McCormick characterized as "Hegemony
at High Tide."'* W ith more than one m illion service personnel stationed
abroad, the United States operated a vast network of m ilitary installations from
Manila to Berlin. Although concerns had been raised over the margin of
America's nuclear missile superiority, the country's m ilitary capabilities still
greatly exceeded all other nations including the Soviet Union. Equally
impressive was America's unparalleled economic growth. In the two decades
that followed W orld War II, economic production exceeded the nation's
aggregate output during its first 170 years of existence. From 1945 to 1963
annual domestic gross national product nearly tripled from $211.9 to $590.5
billion and the number of employed workers increased by 20 m illion. During
this era of unprecedented m ilitary and economic power, the objective of U.S.
foreign policy was to maintain America's prosperity and contain the influence
of the Soviet Union.

'’Thomas j. McCormick, America's Half-Centurv: United States Foreign Policv In The Cold War
(Baltimore, 1989), 125.
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Remarkably, In 1946 America produced 50 percent of the world's goods
and services, possessed a nuclear monopoly, and maintained a 100,000-plane
air force and a 70,000-ship navy. But the instability of the postwar world
joined by fears of another Great Depression pressured the U.S. government to
construct a new international system that encompassed vibrant and stable
markets. American efforts to remake the world based upon liberal national
principles of multilateral trade and democracy resulting in a de facto war
against international communism, a war that permeated the fabric of American
society.
The "Cold War" originated from the many complex events of W orld War
II, which had, according to historian Thomas G. Paterson, "unhinged the world
of stable politics, inherited wisdom traditions, institutions, alliances, loyalties,
commerce, and classes."^ America's prewar inclination toward political
isolationism had diminished significantly after japan's successful attack upon
Pearl Harbor and with the maturation of the nuclear, air and communication
ages. W ith its industrial and agricultural capacity unscathed, the United States
emerged as the w orld's only economic and military superpower, as the once
powerful nations of Europe and Asia had fallen victim to the ravages of war.
Although the Soviet Union survived the ordeal w ith a relatively powerful
conventional army, even its power allowed only for regional hegemony.

^Thomas G. Paterson, On Everv Front: The Making And Unmaking Of The Cold War (New York,
1992), 15.
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thereby leaving the U.S. the predominant architect of the postwar world.
America's future prosperity and security required the cooperation of other
industrialized nations, and given its historic economic, cultural, and political
ties to its major wartime allies, Europe's postwar recovery became a priority
objective for policymakers. The combination of widespread human suffering
and massive commercial and residential property damage in Europe resulted in
political turmoil and spawned socialist and communist movements, particularly
in France, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the Netherlands. By war's end, the
Russian Army had already occupied the entire eastern half of the continent and
Americans feared further western encroachment in addition to the possibility of
indigenous communist victories.
After the war, an uneven and increasingly hostile bipolar w orld had
begun to replace the prewar multipolar configuration of the 1930s. The United
States and the Soviet Union, Paterson observed, "became ensnared in the
instability of the new international system and increasingly clashed...[as] they
built competing spheres of influence." Threatened by America's economic and
military power and suspicious of a U.S. dominated Europe, Russia quickly
severed its wartime alliances and began to independently enhance it own
national security, including increased military and political control over Eastern
European nations. American leaders concluded that Russia had "gone
imperialistic." Their exaggerated anti-Russian rhetoric that stressed the dangers
of "creeping communism" and gave rise to an anti-communist atmosphere
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engulfed America for decades. President Harry S. Truman distinguished
differences between "open" and "exclusive" spheres of influence and justified
increased U.S. militancy: "Though the United States wants no territory or profit
or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases
necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of w orld peace."®
Soviet leaders had reached similar imperialistic conclusions about American
postwar militancy and expansion into Western Europe, Asia and the M iddle
East.
Truman's immediate postwar foreign aid programs dovetailed w ith the
evolution of America's formal anti-communist foreign policy. In February 1946,
U.S. Foreign Service officer, George F. Kennan sent Washington an 8,000 word
cable from Moscow, interpreting Russia's postwar anti-Western behavior. He
wrote "we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that
with [the] US there can be no permanent modus vivendi."'' Kennan's "long
telegram," noted historian john Lewis Gaddis, possessed "ideas of such force
and persuasion" as to inspire an immediate change in American foreign
policy.® The resulting policy of "patience and firmness" evolved into a policy
of "containment," which sought to prevent any Soviet influence in the

®Paterson, On Everv Front. 43, 56, 58, 79.
^Thomas G. Paterson, j. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth j. Hagan, American Foreign Policv: A
Historv / since 1900 (Lexington. Massachusetts, 1983), 444.
®john Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National
Securitv Policv (New York, 1982), 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11

reshaping of the postwar w orld. George Kennan's July 1947 Foreign Affairs
article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," outlined containment as a defense
strategy designed to "confront the Russians w ith unalterable counter-force at
every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a
peaceful and stable world."® Containing the Soviet Union became "the central
preoccupation of postwar national security policy."’®
America's preoccupation w ith the communist threat resulted in activist
policies reliant upon a conventional and nuclear arms build-up and massive
economic and military foreign aid programs. From 1945 to 1947 the United
States provided $9 billion in foreign aid utilizing various indirect conduits such
as the Export-!mport Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United
Nations. Much of this aid went to less-developed countries. W orld War II had
accelerated nationalist movements in Asia, Africa and the M iddle East which
resulted in political instability. As the old European empires began to
disintegrate in places like Indonesia and Vietnam, the United States attempted
to keep the emerging governments w ithin the West's realm of influence.
America's foreign aid policy toward two eastern Mediterranean nations created
lasting and influential precedents.
Bankrupt by five years of war. Great Britain announced its inability to
maintain support of the pro-Western governments of Greece and Turkey.

®Paterson, On Everv Front. 72.
'°Gaddis, Strategies Of Containment, viii.
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Greece had become embroiled in a fierce struggle against communist
insurgents, and Turkey, which possessed a key geographic position between
Russia and the Mediterranean, appeared in comparable jeopardy. Secretary of
State Dean G. Acheson predicted that the "loss" of Turkey and Greece to
communism would open the door for Soviet influence on three continents. In
March 1947 President Truman appealed to the U.S. Congress to "support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by
outside pressures."” Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan
summarized the Truman-Acheson thesis: "the fall of Greece, followed by the
fall of Turkey, would establish a chain reaction around the world which could
very easily leave us isolated in a Communist-dominated e a r t h . T h e
Congress concurred and approved a $400 m illion aid package for the two
countries. The Truman Doctrine, described as "the commanding guide to
American foreign policy in the Cold War," had been officially established.”
Later the same year, the Truman administration received bipartisan
support for the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan,
which provided the nations of Europe more than $13 billion in aid from 1948
through 1951. U.S. leaders hoped that the West's economic recovery and
ensuing prosperity would ultimately prompt Eastern European nations to reject

’’ David McCullough, Truman. (New York, 1992), 548.
’^Robert A. Divine, Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacv in Recent American Historv (New York,
1979), 13.
’^Paterson, et al., American Foreign Policv. 449.
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communism. However, the Marshall Plan, like many other postwar American
foreign policy initiatives, heightened the Soviet Union's security anxieties and
resulted in a hardening "iron curtain."
American efforts to consolidate the Western controlled zones of Germany
and to eventually reunify the war torn country "starkly exposed the great
postwar schism" that had developed between the two major powers.” In june
1948 the Soviets erected a blockade around West Berlin in its own attempt to
integrate the Western-controlled portions of the city w ith communist dominated
East Germany. President Truman intimated that he would risk nuclear war over
the Berlin crisis, but during the follow ing year, as the West airlifted food and
supplies into the city, direct military confrontation was averted. W ith no
alternatives short of war, the Soviets ended the blockade in May 1949.
The Berlin crisis reenforced fears of communist aggression, and in july
1949 the U.S. Senate overwhelming ratified the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), a comprehensive security pact w ith Canada and nine
European nations designed to defend Western Europe from a Soviet invasion.
Retired General Dwight D. Eisenhower was recalled to active duty to become
the first Supreme NATO Commander. This military companion to the Marshall
Plan further raised tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Moscow eventually countered NATO w ith a military alliance, the Warsaw Pact,
comprised of Eastern European nations. The militancy of America's anti-

u Paterson, One Everv Front. 84.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14

communist foreign policy became institutionalized in 1950 w ith Truman's
acceptance of NSC-68. The National Security Council document concluded that
the Soviet Union was bent on world domination and that the spread of
communist influence must be checked by "a much-expanded American defense
establishment."”
Already dismayed by the explosion of Russia's first nuclear bomb in 1949,
America had to cope the same year w ith the military victory o f Mao Tse-tung
and the Chinese Communist Party over the Nationalist government. The United
States had sent $3 billion to Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists during the
bloody civil war in an attempt to keep China, with its vast resources and
potential markets, w ithin the American sphere of influence. Applying a zerosum game mentality to the Cold War, many Americans equated Truman's
"loss" of China as a monumental victory for Moscow. America's prevailing
belief in m onolithic communism prevented any formal relationship between
the United States and communist China, and Washington withheld diplomatic
recognition and blocked its entrance into the United Nations.
United States Asian policy enjoyed better success in the industrial and
political reconstruction of japan, which had remained firm ly under American
control since the end of the war. Under the direction of General Douglas
MacArthur, the Truman administration sought to "rebuild japan as an anti-
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communist bulwark in Asia."” The small countries of Southeast Asia with
their plentiful resources and strategic locales were deemed vital to Japan's
sustained recovery, and, therefore, were incorporated w ithin the security
interest of the United States. After the communist Chinese victory, U.S. leaders
vigilantly fended off any further communist encroachments into the region. In
1950 the Truman administration formally recognized France's puppet
government in Vietnam, which received substantial U.S. m ilitary aid to help
defeat a communist led insurrection.
In June 1950 communist soldiers from North Korea invaded South Korea.
Recounting the failure of the West's appeasement policy at the 1938 Munich
conference and the successes of postwar confrontations in Greece, Turkey and
Berlin, Truman ordered American combat troops to Korea to challenge the
aggressors: "This is the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough enough now
there w on't be any next step."” An overwhelmed South Korea had suffered
heavy casualties and was in danger of losing the war until General MacArthur
commanded a daring amphibious landing on Inchon w hich began to reverse
North Korean gains.
W ith this new-found momentum Truman abandoned the policy of
containment and attempted to "roll-back" communism. MacArthur proceeded
to push the enemy northward to the North Korean and Chinese border.

'®lbid., 92.
” Paterson, et al., American Foreign Policv. 473.
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Threatened by the rapid advancement of U.S. and U.N. forces, communist
China launched a massive ground assault against the multinational troops in
North Korea. MacArthur, w ho was later relieved of command by Truman for
insubordination and for wanting to expand the war to China, was forced to
retreat to back into South Korea. As the conflict bogged down the American
people became increasingly disenchanted w ith the land war in Asia. By war's
end, the original policy objective of containment had been achieved in Korea,
but the intrusion of communist Chinese forces had obliterated the new strategy
of roll-back. More importantly. North Korean aggression validated many
conclusions reached in the U.S. defense document NSC-68 regarding
communist aggression and helped to rally domestic support for its call for
increased militarization. From 1950 to 1953 annual U.S. defense expenditures
increased from $13.1 billion to $50.4 billion.
Truman's unpopular firing of MacArthur, the Korean War stalemate, the
"loss" of China, and the end of America's nuclear monopoly, all contributed to
a second "Red Scare" in the United States that weakened the Democratic
Party's dominant position in American politics. Conservative Republicans,
including Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin, capitalized upon the
circumstances. They attacked the Truman administration for being "soft" on
communism and engaged in red-baiting and witch-hunts searching for
communist subversives. McCarthy's outlandish charges of an organized
communist infiltration of the U.S. government gained widespread acceptance.
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Still, the domestic hysteria had bipartisan roots. The House Un-American
Activities Committee had contributed to the pandemonium, and Truman
himself helped to institutionalize the fear by implementing a Loyalty Program
in 1947, whereby federal job applicants and employees were investigated for
links to communism. Even after McCarthy's censure by the Senate in 1954 and
his death in 1957, the nation's fear of communism continued and its
commitment to w in the Cold War remained resolute.
Against the backdrop of events in China, Korea and the McCarthy
rampage. Republican presidential nominee General D wight D. Eisenhower was
elected in 1952. Despite periodic superpower overtures for peaceful
coexistence during the eight years of the Eisenhower administration, intense
Cold War battles continued. Notwithstanding strident campaign rhetoric to the
contrary, the new President accepted the basic tenets of Truman's containment
policy. Eisenhower also feared "creeping communism," but w ith a penchant for
a balanced budget he applied a "New Look" approach that favored foreign aid,
covert operations and atomic diplomacy over the more costly reliance upon
large ground forces, conventional weapons and limited wars like Korea.’ ®
On several occasions Eisenhower applied brinkmanship, a strategy
whereby the threat of nuclear retaliation was employed to achieve policy
objectives. Ike benefitted from a significant degree of bipartisan support

'®Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. 127.
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regarding foreign affairs, and in 1955, Congress authorized the Formosa
Resolution, which allowed the President to use all necessary force in defense of
the Nationalist Chinese island refuge, Formosa. In two separate instances
Eisenhower threatened communist China over Formosa and the two small
offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Historians have debated the practicality
of Eisenhower's dangerous policy, but the President successfully avoided any
protracted military engagements involving large numbers of U.S. troops.
Faced w ith a rapidly changing Third W orld, Eisenhower approved a range
of covert operations and foreign aid programs to counter instability attributed to
leftist insurrectionists. The Central Intelligence Agency participated in the
overthrow of several foreign governments, including those in Iran and
Guatemala, and planned the ouster of Fidel Castro in Cuba. To augment the
NATO alliance. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arranged a series a
regional defense accords w ith anti-communist nations in Asia and the Middle
East. In Southeast Asia Eisenhower increased already substantial military and
economic aid to French forces in Vietnam. After Vietnam's communist led
victory over France in 1954, the President designated U.S. obligations under
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization as the rationale for supporting South
Vietnam against communism. In defense of his Vietnam policy Eisenhower
subscribed to the domino theory, a familiar hypothesis whereby the loss of one
government to communism would lead to the successive fall of neighboring
governments. This grossly flawed supposition was also applied to the unrelated
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and independent activity o f nationalist groups in the M iddle East.
In defiance of the United States and other western nations, Egypt, lead by
Gamal Abdel Nassar, seized the Suez Canal in July 1956 to help pay for
construction of the Aswan Dam. The United States had recently withdrawn its
offer to help build the dam when Egypt formally recognized communist China
and negotiated an arms purchase w ith communist Czechoslovakia. W ithout
informing the U.S., the trio of Great Britain, France, and Israel coordinated a
counterattack on Egypt in late October. Eisenhower was furious w ith the action
of the allies and feared Soviet intervention. The President soberly concluded
that if the Soviets attacked British or French forces "we would be in war" and
that "we may have to hit them w ith everything in the bucket."’® Eisenhower
moved quickly to defuse the situation and ultimately arranged a peaceful
settlement through the United Nations. Egypt's Aswan Dam was later
constructed w ith the support of the Soviet Union.
Not only did the Suez crisis bring the world to the brink of nuclear war,
but it also overshadowed the Soviet Union's concurrent violent repression of
democratic movements in Eastern Europe. According to Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles, it was "nothing less than tragic that at this very time, when we
are on the point of w inning an immense and long-hoped-for victory over Soviet
colonialism in Eastern Europe, Western colonialism in Egypt was the center of
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the world's attention. It was maddening..."^® In the midst of these foreign
crises, Eisenhower was overwhelmingly elected to a second term as president.
The last years of the Eisenhower administration contained events of both
hope and despair in the Cold War. The successful launch of the Soviet space
satellite Sputnik in 1957 generated fears that the communists had eclipsed U.S.
military technology and were capable of hurling intercontinental nuclear
missiles towards the North American continent. Eisenhower's repeated
assurances that the United States still possessed vastly superior technology and
military capabilities were not entirely persuasive. The administration's political
opponents, not privy to convincing secret intelligence data, made
unsubstantiated charges of "bomber gaps" and "missile gaps." America's
exaggerated reaction to the "Sputnik Challenge" resulted in the increased
militarization of the Cold War.^’
For Eisenhower, a more bona fide crisis arose in 1958, again in the
Middle East. The administration had recently received congressional authority
via the Eisenhower Doctrine to resist communist influence in the region. Barely
two years after the Suez affair, the Iraqi government fell to a group of proNassar military officers and U.S. officials feared neighboring Lebanon would
follow. W hile the President never officially invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine,
he hurriedly deployed thousands of troops to Lebanon to prevent a pro-Nassar
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coup. The action demonstrated Eisenhower's willingness to risk American
troops in a proxy battle against alleged Soviet influence. Equally important,
Eisenhower's policy toward Lebanon, like Guatemala, Iran and Vietnam
previously, demonstrated America's inability to distinguish nationalism from
Soviet-directed communist subversion.
Despite the continued militarization of the Cold War, Soviet Premier
Nikita S. Khrushchev undertook a goodwill tour of America in the autumn of
1959. He downplayed political differences between the superpowers and
stated, "We w ill not bury you, nor w ill you bury us."^^ Plans were arranged
for a formal peace summit in Paris for the follow ing year and Eisenhower
hoped to end his presidency in an aura of cooperation. The May 1960
downing of an American high altitude spy plane over the Soviet Union
doomed all thoughts of a successful conference w ith the Soviets. Eisenhower
eventually assumed public responsibility for the m ilitary blunder but refused to
offer an apology. The Soviets in turn denounced the United States and aborted
the summit meeting. The Cold War raged on.
Eisenhower's management of Cold War policy had been generally
compatible w ith that of the Truman administration. U.S. policymakers,
frequently aided by bipartisan congressional support, were still unable or
unw illing to distinguish between nationalism, neutralism and communism, and
there were no differing assessments of U.S. security interests. Although
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Eisenhower held defense expenditures below Korean W ar levels, he helped
expand the arms race to include space and missile technology. And w hile
Eisenhower's successor pledged to be "more effective" and "more active" in the
battle against international communism, the new administration's basic policies
were firm ly rooted in the Cold War legacies of Truman and Eisenhower." An
ardent anti-communist. President John F. Kennedy believed that the Cold War
was best "waged against communism abroad, not argued at h o m e .""
Kennedy's first major foreign policy challenge came in April 1961 with a
CIA sponsored invasion of Cuba that had been organized by the Eisenhower
administration. A staunch anti-communist, Kennedy supported the overthrow of
Castro. Since he had chastised Eisenhower during the campaign for allowing
the establishment of a communist satellite just off the Florida coast, the young
President felt even more compelled to follow through w ith the invasion.
Despite months of planning, Castro's heavily armed m ilitia easily routed the
amphibious assault. Unlike Eisenhower's previous successes in Iran and
Guatemala, the Cuban expedition failed miserably. Kennedy, w ho had denied
CIA requests for U.S. air cover, blamed the disaster on "faulty intelligence and
sloppy execution."" The Bay of Pigs fiasco did not weaken Kennedy's resolve
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to oust Castro or w in the Cold War, rather, according to historian Robert A.
Divine, the lesson learned from Cuba was that "harder work, greater sacrifice,
and even more reliance on military force were needed to win."^®
Kennedy replaced Ike's New Look approach to containment with
"Flexible Response," which in theory allowed the U.S. to respond more
effectively to a w ider variety of communist threats. The administration
embarked on a broader m ilitary build-up to w in the Cold War w ith new
initiatives such as, paramilitary training, the Peace Corps, and the Alliance For
Progress. From 1960 to 1963 Kennedy augmented m ilitary spending, including
both conventional and nuclear weapons, from $45.9 to $53.2 billion, and with
an expanded draft he greatly increased the number of people in military
service. In response to Khrushchev's January 1960 pledge to support "wars of
national liberation," Kennedy took personal interest in developing
counterinsurgency forces needed to repel communist guerrillas.^’' The
increasing political instability in Third W orld provided Kennedy the opportunity
to apply these new paramilitary techniques against communist insurgents.
Kennedy's aggressive policy toward South Vietnam demonstrated the
continuity of American postwar foreign policy and the new administration's
intense desire to achieve a Cold War victory. Truman and Eisenhower had
supported massive military aid to France and its South Vietnamese successor
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government, but both had resisted temptations to involve large numbers of
American troops. JFK, who as a young senator had criticized Truman for losing
China to communism, tripled military aid to Vietnam and increased U.S. troop
presence from 3,205 in 1961 to 16,700 in 1963. Despite these efforts,
conditions in South Vietnam deteriorated and during Kennedy's three years in
office more than 600 American soldiers were killed.
America's confrontations with communism under Kennedy's tutelage were
not limited to proxy wars in the less-developed world. Russian demands for the
removal of allied troops from West Berlin had sparked several international
crises since W orld War II and Khrushchev, wanting to test the new American
president, repeated the summons to Kennedy. The young President held "cold
and firm" and refused to negotiate Berlin's future; this led Khrushchev to order
the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 19 61 ." Kennedy accepted the
permanent division of the city leading historian Stephen Ambrose to conclude,
"The great powers had decided that Berlin, and beyond it Germany, were not
worth a nuclear exchange...nothing vital had been sacrificed."" Three weeks
later in response to Kennedy's continued military build-up, the Soviets ended a
joint three year moratorium on nuclear testing and began a series of tests that
culminated in the largest atomic explosion in history.
More aggressive maneuvering the following year that brought the two
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powers to the edge of war. The dangerous brinkmanship of the Eisenhower
years paled in comparison to that of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In midOctober an American U-2 spy plane photographed the construction of Soviet
ground missile sites in Cuba. Twenty-two nuclear warheads had already been
delivered. In a nationally televised address on October 22, Kennedy announced
a U.S. military blockade of the small island. The President asserted that a
missile launch from Cuba would be interpreted as "an attack by the Soviet
Union on the United States, requiring full retaliatory response upon the Soviet
U n io n ."" W ithin two days the Air Force had 550 aircraft, some carrying
atomic weaponry, in constant flight. Tensions peaked on October 27, when the
Soviets shot down a U-2 plane flying over Cuba. Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara later observed that one bomb "directed at Miami or New York or
even Washington might have killed a m illion or 2 m illion people."®’ A
peaceful solution ensued when Khrushchev offered to withdraw the missiles in
return for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. But a subsequent demand, the
removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey, arrived from Moscow shortly thereafter.
Kennedy publicly pledged not to invade Cuba and privately agreed to remove
the Turkey missiles. Kennedy biographer James N. G iglio characterized the
Cuban missile crisis as JFK's most significant Cold War victory.®®

®°James N. G ig lio, The Presidency o f lohn F. Kennedy (Lawrence, KS, 1991), 240.
®’ LaFeber, The American Age. 569.
®®Giglio, Kennedy. 189-220.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26

After the Soviets w ithdrew their missiles from Cuba, relations between the
Cold War antagonists showed signs of improvement as both agreed to a
Washington-Moscow "hot-line," a ban against atomic weapons in space, a 65
m illion bushel wheat sale to Russia, and a limited nuclear test treaty that
banned nuclear testing under water, in the atmosphere, or in outer space.
However, the peaceful resolution of the Cuban crisis and the subsequent aura
of detente did not completely thaw Cold War tensions. Soviet hardliners
escalated their weapons build-up to overcome their nuclear inferiority. In
Washington, the Cuban crisis had served to validate an already "arrogant belief
in the efficacy of American answers to w orld problems through the exercise of
United States power."®®
By 1963 the United States operated 275 military bases in 31 countries.
The number of military and other government personnel totalled more than
1.25 m illion. In a three year period the number of intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) had increased by more than 600 percent from 61 to 424, the
defense budget had grown by more than $7.0 billion; and the government had
implemented a $207 m illion civilian nuclear fallout shelter-program. According
to historian Walter LeFeber, "confidence in U.S. power and in a glamorous,
active presidency had never been higher. That confidence resembled a star that
beamed brightest just as it began to burn out."®" President Kennedy's
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assassination in November 1963 temporarily caused the nation to look inward,
but the brewing Cold War, w ith crises in Southeast Asia and Latin America,
and persistent tensions w ith the Soviet Union and communist China, would
return foreign policy issues to the forefront of national attention during the
presidential election campaigns of 1964.
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CHAPTER 3

FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS, 1948-1960

America's Cold War against international communism often influenced
the country's national elections. W hile the exact importance of foreign policy
to American voters has been difficult to gauge, the nation's postwar acceptance
of internationalism caused foreign affairs to become a "major factor" in U.S.
presidential elections. In his two volume w ork spanning elections from 1940 to
1960, Robert A. Divine demonstrated that events of the Cold War "insured the
continued prominence of international considerations in American presidential
politics."®®
By 1947 many Americans had begun to question President Harry S.
Truman's ability to govern the nation into the next decade. Some prominent
Democrats, who doubted his electability in the next presidential race,
attempted to draft "the glamorous general," Dwight D. Eisenhower, as their
nominee. Determined to be elected president in his own right, Truman fought
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off bitter attacks from both liberal and conservative Democrats. According to
biographer David McCullough "not even Herbert Hoover in his darkest days,
had been treated w ith such open contempt by his own party."®® Ultra-liberal
Henry Wallace, w ho was eventually nominated for president by the Progressive
Citizens of America party, became a vocal critic of the administration's foreign
policy. Wallace and the Progressives called for direct negotiations w ith the
Soviet Union to end the Cold War. Southern Democrats attacked from the
right. The conservative "dixiecrats" endorsed Truman's containment strategy but
detested his burgeoning pro-civil rights policy. After losing a floor fight over the
party's pro-civil rights platform at the Democratic national convention, the
conservatives defected and formed the pro-segregationist States' Rights Party led
by Strom Thurmond. Despite the party's fragmentation, Truman's control over
the Democratic machinery and Eisenhower's refusal to join the fray, enabled
the Missourian to win the presidential nomination on the first ballot.
Given the rancorous Democratic infighting, the Republicans were
confident of w inning the W hite House after a sixteen-year absence. At the GOP
convention there was "never anything but victory in the air." The delegates
renominated the popular New York governor, Thomas Dewey, who had lost to
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944 by approximately 3.5 m illion votes, FDR's
narrowest margin of victory. A self-assured Dewey told his delegates, "Our task
is to fill our victory w ith such meaning that mankind everywhere, yearning for
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freedom, w ill take heart and move forward..."®® Operating more like an
incumbent than a challenger, Dewey ran a controlled campaign that promoted
national unity. He refused to debate specific issues, and guided by Senator
Arthur Vandenberg and Republican strategist John Foster Dulles, Dewey
generally avoided any critical commentary on international affairs.
The Russian blockade of Berlin in June 1948 and the allies massive airlift
of food and supplies dominated news reports during the election. The
increasingly successful airlift proved to be "one of the most brilliant American
achievements of the postwar era" and worked to Truman's advantage.®®
Although Truman feared that "we are very close to war," advisor Clark Clifford
reminded the President that "In times of crisis the American citizen tends to
back up his President." Dewey, in fact, was a Cold W arrior who supported a
powerful military, aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, and the Berlin
Airlift. According to Robert Divine, the challenger "hewed closely to the
bipartisan foreign policy line" and "refused to attack the Democrats on
Berlin."®®
At Clifford's advice, Truman "moved to the left" on domestic issues and
continued his "get tough policy w ith the Kremlin.""® Supported by cheers of
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"Give'em hell, Harry," Truman crisscrossed the nation by rail. His stump
speeches emphasized domestic issues whereby he condemned the "Republican
'do-nothing' 80th Congress" and appealed to the Democratic Party's stalwart
supporters: labor, farmers, intellectuals, city bosses, southerners, and the
working poor. Truman preferred to bypass his opponent and level attacks on
the conservative wing of the Republican Party, whom the President claimed
w ould "dismantle the progress made by the New Deal and in foreign affairs,
retreat back into isolationism, which would be disastrous for the country and
the w orld." "Some things are worth fighting for" he exclaimed, "We must fight
isolationists and reactionaries, the profiteers and the privileged class...""’
Truman's strident anti-communist policy appealed to the large block of
European ethnic voters, which led his biographer David McCullough to
conclude that "for no other reason than his stand on foreign policy, Truman
had an excellent chance of w inning their support." At the risk of alienating oil
rich Arab nations, Truman salvaged the volatile Jewish vote by extending de
facto recognition to the new Israeli nation in May 1947. As the dark horse in
the campaign, Truman was forced to differentiate himself from Dewey, and he
chose to balance his Cold W ar rhetoric with that of a peace candidate. He
warned voters to "'Keep your bullets bright and you powder dry'...we w ill get
peace in this w orld." W ith tensions running high over the Berlin crisis, Truman
privately confided "It's all so futile. Dewey, Wallace, the cockeyed southerners
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and if I w in ...!'!! probably have a Russian war on my hands.""®
Probable war against the Soviet Union had promoted Henry Wallace to
run against the incumbent. He had defined the Truman Doctrine as "a curious
mixture of power politics and international carpetbagging.""® The entrance of
the Progressives into the campaign temporarily elevated foreign policy to the
forefront of public view. Wallace blamed the U.S. for the Cold War,
denounced the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, demanded the recall of
American troops stationed abroad, and advocated the destruction of America's
nuclear arsenal. He believed that direct negotiation w ith the Soviets was the
only viable way to end the Cold War. Interest in the Wallace candidacy began
to wane during the year as the ongoing Berlin crisis seemed to validate
mainstream charges of communist led aggression. Furthermore, Wallace failed
to fully repudiate support from the Communist Party and his Progressive "peace
party" was increasingly portrayed by opponents as a tool of Moscow.
Truman's opponent on the right, Thomas Dewey sought to exploit the
issue of communists in the U.S. government. In mid-summer 1948, witnesses
before the House Un-American Activities Committee testified that there were
numerous spies in the Truman administration and accused a former State
Department official, Alger Hiss, of participating in a subversive communist
network. The news electrified Washington. To make matters worse for the

"®lbid., 651, 676, 683.
"’ Robert A. D ivine, Foreign Policv And U.S. Presidential Elections. 1940-1948 (N ew York, 1974),
170.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33

Democrats, Hiss had been an active supporter of Roosevelt's New Deal and
Truman's Fair Deal programs. Dewey recommended that voters "elect an
administration that simply w o n 't appoint them (communists) in the first place."
Throughout the campaign, the Republican claimed that "Communists and
fellow travelers [have] risen to positions of trust in our govern ment... [and yet]
the head of our own government called the exposure o f Communists in our
government 'a red herring.'" Truman responded by branding Dewey's charges a
"smoke screen" designed to hide the inadequacies of the Republican Party. The
President boasted further that his Loyalty Program had "proven the loyalty of
99.7% of all federal workers" and that "It was not Republican talk that checked
the Communist tide, but programs like the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall
Plan."""
Truman and some of his campaign advisors believed that they needed "a
bold move" to demonstrate the President's sincere desire for w orld peace. In
what became known as the Vinson mission. Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson was
asked to go to Moscow to hold a private consultation w ith Joseph Stalin over
the Berlin crisis. Vinson had no diplomatic experience and when Secretary of
State George C. Marshall heard of the plan he killed it immediately. After the
press reported news of the aborted mission, Truman was accused of the
cardinal Cold War sin, appeasement. Dewey, ever confident of victory, told
reporters that the current mismanagement of the government w ould soon be
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rectified "If Harry Truman would just keep his hands off things for another few
weeks! Particularly, if he w ill keep his hands off foreign policy, about which he
knows considerably less than nothing." By the end of the campaign, a
desperate Truman leveled a rare and vicious blow at the Republican; he
proclaimed, "a vote for Dewey was a vote for fascism.""®
Dewy's low-key strategy designed to avoid mistakes appeared to be
effective as most political analysts predicted a GOP victory. The Republican
nominee demonstrated his confidence late in the campaign by embarking upon
a week long vacation. By contrast, Truman refused to concede defeat and
continued his exhaustive touring. The incumbent's hard w ork and balanced
strategy of remaining firm against communism and appealing to the New Deal
coalition succeeded brilliantly. In a dramatic upset victory, Truman defeated
the Dewy by more than two m illion votes. The President collected 330
electoral votes compared to only 189 for Dewey. The Strom Thurmond and the
"dixiecrats" managed to collect 38 electoral votes from four southern states
w hile Wallace and the Progressives failed to capture even one state.
There can be no doubt that Truman's relentless campaigning on New
Deal domestic issues was the most important factor to voters in 1948, but
David McCullough added that "The precarious state of the w orld also appeared
to have benefitted the Truman campaign, and particularly as it became clear
that the Berlin A irlift was a resounding success." In retrospect, most political
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analysts have agreed w ith Clark Clifford's assessment that, "Dewey's whole
campaign was a mistake...They were greedy and dumb, and anxious to get
back to power.""® The arrogant GOP had attempted to utilize the postwar
bipartisan foreign policy to their advantage and consequently neglected
"promising" and "ripe" issues of the continued suppression of Eastern Europe,
the "loss" of China, and Truman's new Palestine policy. Republicans never
again campaigned on a completely bipartisan foreign policy, and the stunned
GOP had to wait another four years to correct their mistakes."®
By the summer of 1952, President Truman's public approval rating had
declined to an abysmal 26 percent. Weighed down by McCarthyism, the
Korean War stalemate, and charges of corruption in government, the President
chose not to seek reelection and instead contemplated a suitable successor.
Many Democratic leaders were disappointed to learn that the Republicans had
successfully induced the ever popular Dwight Eisenhower to run for their
party's presidential nomination. The GOP's powerful eastern liberal wing
backed the Eisenhower candidacy which came to symbolize "collective security
and a European-first orientation.""®
Only "Mr. Republican," Senator Robert Taft of O hio, seriously challenged
Ike for the nomination. W hile generally conservative on domestic matters.
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Eisenhower differed greatly from Taft on foreign affairs. Ike, a full fledged
internationalist, eagerly supported the Truman Doctrine and personally oversaw
in the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Taft, on the
other hand, was a vocal critic of economic multilateralism and was less w illin g
to extend American commitments abroad. At best the senator was a begrudging
Cold W arrior w ho was w illin g to condone the Marshall Plan and aid to
Greece, but not the long term deployment of U.S. troops under NATO. When
the two wings o f the Republican Party squared off at the Chicago National
Convention, polling data indicated that only the w idely popular general would
be able to defeat the leading Democratic nominees. By the end of the GOP
convention, most Republican delegates had reached the same conclusion and
nominated Eisenhower for the presidency.
The selection of Eisenhower's opponent proved more complicated.
Ultimately the Democrats compromised on Illinois governor Adlai Stevenson.
As a former Assistant Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of the Navy in
the Roosevelt administration, the eloquent governor could legitimately
campaign as both a New Dealer and an expert in foreign affairs. Many party
leaders and intellectuals supported the "scholarly and reflective" Stevenson
despite the glaring weakness that he was generally unknown to the national
electorate."®
Forced to respond to repeated Republican attacks on Truman's Asian
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policy, Stevenson argued that the United States could not have "saved" China
from communism in 1949 w ithout starting W orld War III. Furthermore, he
stressed that bombing China during the Korean War would have caused the
same result. Stevenson reminded the GOP that there had been bipartisan
support to demilitarize Korea after W orld War II, and that there had also been
bipartisan support for Truman's original decision to deploy U.S. combat troops
to repel the North Korean invasion. Had the President not acted swiftly, he
said, communism "could have picked away at the free w orld and engulfed
more millions, piece by piece...[until] we would have had to fight." Stevenson
also emphasized that the West could also have "lost" Japan and East Asia.®®
In addition to overcoming his anonymity, Stevenson attempted to
distinguish himself from the discredited Truman administration, a daunting task.
As a firm anti-communist, the governor blamed the Cold War on Soviet
aggression and lauded Truman's activist foreign policy. His speeches often
echoed Truman's 1948 campaign, as he favored a powerful military "not with a
view toward war but w ith a view toward preventing war and negotiating the
conditions of peace." Stevenson also cautioned Americans that "victory was not
always possible"; since the nation's resources were finite, its goals had to be
realistic.®’
Also reminiscent of Truman four years earlier, the Democratic nominee
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linked Eisenhower's candidacy to "reckless" right w ing Republicans, who had
simultaneously called for the bombing of China and for the removal of U.S.
troops from Europe. He attacked the general's vague call for the "liberation" of
Eastern Europe. Such a policy, he assured voters, w ould lead to war w ith the
Soviet Union. The governor also criticized Ike's proposal to reduce defense
spending by relying more heavily upon a nuclear deterrent and the Air Force.
Stevenson argued that a "high budget, high taxes, inflation, even deaths in
Korea, were the price America must pay to maintain freedom.
Stevenson struggled to reassemble the vital coalition of New Deal voters,
and mid-way through the contest he asked Truman to jo in the campaign. An
enthusiastic Truman went on the attack. Utilizing the same strategy he
employed against Dewey, the President portrayed General Eisenhower as a
captive of the party's conservative wing and warned voters to "beware of the
isolationists: they would cut foreign aid, slash the defense budget, and embark
upon a reckless policy of 'liberation.'" He accused the Republicans of running
a campaign of "fear and deception" and told voters they could choose between
"stopping Communism and retreating before the red menace or plunging the
world into atomic warfare."®®
Unlike his predecessor in the 1948 election, Eisenhower planned a
vigorous and aggressive national campaign. First he moved to solidify
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Republican support for the ticket, which meant a rapprochement w ith Taft
conservatives. By September, Senator Taft had stated publicly that he agreed
with Ike "100 per cent" on domestic issues and "to a large extent" on foreign
affairs. The Democrats created a minor stir for the ticket by chastising
Eisenhower for "surrendering" to the right wing, but most voters appeared
unconcerned w ith the nominee's positioning. A more serious controversy arose
in October when news broke that Eisenhower had deleted from a prepared
speech a "strong rebuke" of GOP Senator Joseph McCarthy and "staunch
defense" of Truman's Secretary of State George Marshall, whom the Wisconsin
senator had called a "traitor."®" The political mistake seemed to substantiate
the Democrats' association of Ike w ith the right wing. An embarrassed
Eisenhower deeply regretted the blunder and in later speeches lauded Marshall
as a great patriot.
General Eisenhower campaigned against "creeping socialism" at home
and Truman's "inept waging of the Cold War abroad."®® He referred to
Washington as a place of "waste and extravagance and inefficiency; of
incompetence...; of corruption...; of bungling in our affairs at home; of
fumbling in the life and death matter of war and peace."®® Eisenhower
promised a strong military with "great retaliatory power" and a "drastic
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reduction" in the federal budget that would stimulate economic growth.®® He
also called for a new foreign policy o f "liberation" intended to support the
suppressed peoples of Eastern Europe announcing "we w ill abandon the policy
of mere containment and actively develop hope" and "never desist in our aid
to those shackled" by communism.®®
As the campaign progressed, foreign affairs and particularly the Korean
War became the election's most important issue. In a simplistic but persuasive
statement, GOP stalwart Thomas Dewey proclaimed that "Stalin is most afraid
of Eisenhower, certainly not Stevenson." Public discontent w ith the Korean War
escalated as troop casualties mounted and the stalemate continued. In January
only 25 percent of voters considered Korea the most important problem facing
the nation, but by late October the number increased to 52 percent.
Eisenhower had started the campaign backing Truman's Korean War policy,
however, he later accused the President of "squandering American prestige and
power."®® The closest Eisenhower came to offering a solution to the Korean
stalemate came one month before the election when he pledged to build up
South Korean defenses and announced "If there must be a war there, let it be
Asians against Asians..."®® Stevenson contended that this "proposal of a quick
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and easy way out of Korea..is false." Two weeks later, Ike delivered what
turned out to be the fatal blow w hile campaigning in Michigan; he told voters
that if peace requires "a personal trip to Korea...I shall go to Korea."®’ It was
futile for Stevenson to counter w ith any comparable pledge. Historian Robert
Divine concluded that "The promise to go to Korea, coming from the man
identified in the public mind w ith the victory in W orld War II, clinched the
election."®®
Eisenhower received more votes than any previous presidential candidate
in history, 33.9 m illion, and he won victories in 39 of 48 states. Unlike the
1948 election when domestic issues dominated the campaign, the single most
decisive issue in 1952 proved to be the Korean War. Pollster Louis Harris
concluded that the war issue "was easily the Achilles heel of the Democratic
campaign."®® The effects o f war abroad would significantly influence voters
again in the presidential election of 1956.
Key Republicans had begun to pressure President Eisenhower to run for a
second term immediately after his recovery from a massive heart attack in
January 1956. W ith no viable successor in place and w ith his physician's
approval, Eisenhower announced his intention to seek reelection. Although he
planned a limited campaign, Ike told advisors that he still had to "prove to the
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American people I am a rather healthy individual."®'’ The President's approval
rating was a stellar 71 percent in Spring of 1956 and w ith a vibrant domestic
economy and the w orld at peace, the Democrats' chances of unseating
Eisenhower appeared bleak.
Democratic hopes were buoyed in June when the sixty-five-year-old
President was hospitalized w ith ileitis, raising serious questions over his
physical ability to lead the nation for another four years. Adlai Stevenson
reemerged as the Democratic presidential nominee after a "hectic struggle"
against Estes Kefauver, Averell Harriman and Lyndon Johnson. Once again
Stevenson attempted to reconstruct the New Deal coalition of voters that had
proved successful for Truman in 1948. He transversed the country and
campaigned w ith "great conviction." In attempts to capitalize on the "health
issue" Stevenson frequently described Ike as "a part-time leader."®® Given Ike's
bipartisan successes w ith Congress on matters of defense and foreign affairs,
political advisors urged the Democratic nominee to subordinate foreign policy
to domestic policy during the campaign. In the summer of 1956 during the
beginning of the Suez crisis. Democratic Senate Majority Leader Lyndon
Johnson reconfirmed bipartisan support for the President by telling newsmen,
"Politics stop at the water's edge when the security of our country is at
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stake."®® The Democratic nominee reluctantly agreed but still managed to
raise two defense issues in a rare early speech devoted to foreign affairs.
Stevenson called for an end to the draft and implementation of an all voluntary
professional military. But his main goal was a pledge to stop all nuclear testing.
A negotiated test ban accord with the Soviets, he claimed, would eradicate
dangerous radiation fallout and curtail the arms race. He denounced
Eisenhower's foreign affairs management as "guile in international dealings,"
and argued that Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, not the President's diplomacy,
had led to the end of the Korean War.®^
The Republicans seized the opportunity to make foreign policy a central
campaign issue. Most Americans disagreed w ith Stevenson's assertion and
credited Eisenhower w ith negotiating the truce in Korea, which proved a
"powerful arrow in the Republican campaign quiver right down to election
day."®® The country's general economic prosperity negated the importance of
Stevenson's stance on domestic issues, and the Commander In Chief convinced
voters that the former governor's positions on defense policy were "unsound
and dangerous."®® Eisenhower even referred to the nuclear test ban idea as "a
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theatrical gesture."^® Campaigning on his record of peace and prosperity,
Eisenhower proclaimed "everything's booming but the guns."^’ The
President's gradual recovery from his bout w ith ileitis and the rise of an
international crisis quickly eliminated any chances of a Democratic victory.
Eisenhower's management of the October-November 1956 Suez crisis was
regarded by biographer Stephen Ambrose as one of his "greatest moments as
President." The President feared Russian intervention on Egypt's behalf and told
cabinet members, "if those fellows start something, we may have to hit'em"
and "we w ould be justified in taking m ilitary action even if Congress were not
in session." On November 5, the day before the presidential election, "all hell
broke loose" as British and French forces landed in Egypt. To the surprise of
most nations the United States condemned the aggression of its allies, backed
the sovereignty of Egypt and utilized the United Nations to arrange a peaceful
settlement. Fortunately for Eisenhower, the Suez crisis overshadowed the
United State's unwillingness to aid the simultaneous outbreaks of nationalism
in Poland and Hungary, which would have fu lly exposed the hollowness of the
administration's long stated "liberation" policy.''^
Stevenson's decision not to attack Ike on his M iddle East and Eastern
European policies was reminiscent of Dewy's handling o f the Berlin crisis in
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1948. Not wanting to jeopardize Eisenhower's efforts to peacefully resolve a
perilous situation, Stevenson was unable to capitalize on w orld events. Had the
Democratic nominee developed themes concerning the dangers of
brinkmanship and massive retaliation during the campaign, he would have
been able to utilize the international crises to his advantage. Instead, as many
as three m illion voters switched from Stevenson to Eisenhower during the last
two weeks of the contest. Historian Robert A. Divine described election day as
the "tensest moment in the Cold War since the Berlin blockade in 1948," and
the country rallied behind Eisenhower just as it had w ith Truman in 1948.^®
Eisenhower's crisis management combined w ith the nation's underlying
economic prosperity to earn the GOP its first successful presidential reelection
since Ulysses S. Grant. The outcome of the 1956 election was viewed as "the
most spectacular presidential victory" in twenty y e a r s . T h e strong economy
prevented Stevenson from consolidating enough voter support behind his
domestic agenda, and his ideas to change the defense policies of the nation's
most popular living general proved pointless. A Stevenson biographer
concluded, that it was "impossible to defeat a president whose aces in the hole
were peace, prosperity - and war."^®
W orld events during Eisenhower's second term raised Cold W ar tensions
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to new levels. The 1957 Sputnik launch created a "crisis o f confidence" in the
United States that impacted both domestic and foreign policy far into the
1960s.^® Capitalizing on the public's fear of Soviet technological advances,
the Democrats attacked Eisenhower for allowing a "missile gap, space gap,
limited-war gap."^^ Using high altitude spy planes, the administration knew
there were no such gaps but could not refute the charges publicly w ithout
jeopardizing national security. The Sputnik launch, increasing Soviet influence
in Cuba, and Khrushchev's militant rhetoric combined to elevate the
importance of foreign affairs in the 1960 presidential election.
The May 1960 downing of a U-2 reconnaissance plane inside Soviet
territory shattered Eisenhower's hopes of ending his presidency during a thaw
in the Cold War. The President's refusal to offer the Soviet Union an official
apology led Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev to denounce the United States
and prematurely disband the Paris summit conference. American-Soviet
relations also worsened over Cuba. Fidel Castro, who had become increasingly
hostile towards the United States after the 1959 revolution, began building a
military and economic alliance w ith the Soviet Union. In response, Eisenhower
ordered a 95 percent reduction in Cuban sugar imports in July 1960. Two
months later Khrushchev embarked upon a "stormy" twenty-five day trip to
New York to attend the United Nation's General Assembly meeting. In fiery
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speeches Khrushchev criticized the United States and the U.N. for policies
toward Africa and warned that Soviet missiles were being manufactured "like
sausages."^® Khrushchev's U.N. mission emphasized the growth of the Soviet
military, economic, and political strength, which presented renewed threats to
the United States. In 1960 the Republicans had hoped to campaign on
Eisenhower's eight year record of peace, but these Cold W ar developments
vitiated that position and opened the door for Democratic attacks.
In all likelihood Eisenhower could have been reelected to a third term
had it been allowable. After serving two terms as vice president, Richard M.
Nixon was virtually assured the Republican nomination. O nly the popular and
wealthy governor of New York, Nelson A. Rockefeller, was considered a
serious competitor. A former assistant to President Eisenhower and the only
Republican to w in a major election victory in 1956, Rockefeller had become a
vocal critic of the administration's domestic and foreign policies. When early
polling data reflected a large Nixon lead, the governor w ithdrew his candidacy.
Certain of victory, Nixon moved to solidify the support o f the party's powerful
eastern liberal wing and arranged for a private meeting w ith Rockefeller. Nixon
agreed to strengthen the convention platform's call for increased defense
spending and to liberalize various domestic planks. The private pact provoked
outrage among the party's conservative wing, but the Republicans emerged
from their convention unified.
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Nixon's acceptance address reflected the staunch Cold War rhetoric that
was critical to both candidates throughout the campaign: "We are in a race...for
the survival in which our lives, our fortunes, our liberties are at stake...It is not
enough for us to reply that our aim is to contain communism, to defend the
free w orld against communism...; the only answer...is a strategy of victory for
the free w orld." Nixon also took the opportunity to attack a leading Democratic
presidential candidate. Senator John F. Kennedy, w ho had suggested that
Eisenhower apologize to the Soviet Union for the failed U-2 mission. Nixon
called the senator's suggestion "rash and impulsive" and defended the flights as
necessary to "save our country from surprise attack."^®
There was no shortage of candidates for the 1960 Democratic
nomination. Standard bearer Adlai Stevenson and Senate M ajority Leader
Lyndon Johnson both coveted the nomination but refused to pursue it overtly.
Missouri Senator Stuart Symington, who campaigned on the single issue of
increased defense preparedness, appeared to be a potential compromise
candidate. O nly Senators Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and Kennedy of
Massachusetts battled for convention delegates via the party's primary
elections. Given Kennedy's comparatively weak legislative record and the fact
that he was Catholic, most party leaders considered him the underdog. But
Kennedy was popular w ith voters, and his well financed and organized
campaign produced important victories in the Wisconsin and West Virginia
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primaries, which ultimately forced Humphrey from the contest. Even the late
entrance of the powerful Johnson, who had called Kennedy the "boyish
appeaser of the Soviets," could not derail the Massachusetts team.®® Kennedy
had effectively cultivated local and state party leaders and systematically
accumulated enough delegates to w in the Democratic nomination on the first
ballot.
Many political insiders viewed the 1960 presidential election as a "contest
between two ruthlessly ambitious young men, both smoothly skilled in politics
and public relations, and both possessing more cool reserve than deep
emotional convictions." Television had replaced newspapers as the most
influential medium to voters, and both candidates agreed to a series of
televised debates. The first debate held in late September constituted a major
turning point for JFK as his impressive performance on national television
helped solidify support for his candidacy w ithin the Democratic Party.
Although Nixon reassured voters of his "experience," he was clearly less
telegenic than his opponent and failed to generate any unexpected enthusiasm.
During the second debate on October 7, Nixon "drew first blood" and "scored
heavily" on the issue of defending the small Chinese islands of Quemoy and
Matsu, which were occupied by Nationalist Chinese forces. Kennedy, who
thought the islands "indefensible," had criticized Eisenhower for risking war
with communist China over their protection. Nixon responded by saying "that
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is the same kind of w ooly thinking that led to disaster for America in Korea,"
and he pledged not to "yield one inch of 'free soil'" to the communists.®’
Overall the debates were fairly close but probably benefitted Kennedy more
than Nixon.
Since both men had traveled extensively abroad and preferred discussing
foreign affairs over domestic policy, defense policy evolved as a central issue in
the campaign. Each candidate sought to dramatize the importance of foreign
policy leadership as an decisive issue, even though they both agreed that the
objective of U.S. foreign policy was outright victory in the Cold War. The
candidates regularly accused each other of being "impulsive" in their decision
making and inclined to "shoot from the hip."®^ Nixon, who as a congressman
in 1948 had gained prominence as an anti-communist zealot by leading the
crusade against Alger Hiss, resolved in 1960 to defend the Eisenhower record
and reconstruct his contribution to it. Senator Kennedy was also an established
Cold W arrior who had condemned Truman in 1948 for the "loss" of China and
Eisenhower in 1960 for the "loss" of Cuba. Still, when pressed by reporters,
Kennedy admitted that he basically "endorsed" Truman's and Eisenhower's
foreign policies. As a result, the foreign affairs debate primarily revolved
around a partisan critique o f eight years of Republican management of the Cold
War and voter evaluation o f the candidates' leadership abilities.
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Kennedy presented his foreign affairs platform w ithin his broad campaign
theme of "lets get the country moving again." Ultimately he called for
increased m ilitary preparedness and proclaimed that he could wage the Cold
War more effectively. Kennedy characterized Republican policies as ones of
"retreat, defeat and weakness" and attacked Eisenhower w ithout naming the
popular president.®® The Democratic nominee said that he "deplored the
greater Russian progress in space, the decline of U.S. prestige abroad, and the
lag in America's appeal to the developing world."®'* Kennedy leveled direct
blows at Nixon and emphasized the Cuba issue: "I wasn't the vice president
who presided over the communization of Cuba," and "I'm not impressed with
those who say they stood up to Khrushchev when Castro has defied them 90
miles away."®® As the campaign progressed, Kennedy espoused such fierce
Cold War rhetoric that historian Thomas Paterson contended "John Foster
Dulles could not have said it better."®® For example he said:
I think there is a danger that history w ill make a judgment that these were the days when the
tide began to run out for the United States. These were the times when the communist tide
began to pour in. The enemy is lean and hungry and the United States is the only sentinel at
the gate. The enemy is the Communist system itself-implacable, unceasing in its drive for
world domination. For this is not a struggle for the supremacy of arms alone-it is also a
struggle for supremacy between two conflicting ideologies: Freedom under God versus ruthless,
godless tyranny. [TJhe only thing that w ill deter Mr. Khrushchev from loosing his hounds of
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hell on us w ill be a strong U.S.. I want to outdo him...outproduce him.®^

Despite the Democratic nominee's rhetoric, Nixon warned that a Kennedy
presidency would be a throw back to the Truman administration and the Vice
President proclaimed that the country had "left the policy of retreat behind us
in 1953." The Republican repeatedly recalled his performance against
Khrushchev in the famous "kitchen debate" as a proof of his experience and
ability in foreign affairs. In July 1959, Nixon had embarked upon a good-will
mission to Russia where he encountered an irritated Khrushchev. At an
exhibition displaying an American model home, the tw o men became
embroiled in a bitter argument. The whole affair had been captured on film
and the footage displayed Nixon "standing toe to toe w ith the Soviet leader, his
finger in the Russian's face, defending American honor and integrity in an
admirable fashion."®®
Recognizing the closeness of the contest, the Vice President asked for and
received Eisenhower's direct support. Privately Ike had confided that he would
do "almost anything to avoid turning my chair and the country over to
Kennedy," and he campaigned vigorously, though more in support of his own
record than as a proponent of Nixon. Historian Stephen Ambrose concluded
that Ike's public comments "never constituted that clear-cut, total endorsement
Nixon so desperately needed. The total effect was almost devastating." Because
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Nixon continued to emphasize his experience in decision making, reporters
hounded Eisenhower to provide an example o f Nixon's input into a major
policy decision. Ike responded rashly, "If you give me a week I might think of
one. I don't remember." The Democrats and the press relished the blunder.®®
In a last ditch effort reminiscent of the 1952 Korea pledge, Nixon promised to
send Eisenhower on a good-will mission to communist bloc nations.
Unlike Eisenhower's Korean pledge, Nixon's offer was made to no avail.
Kennedy captured one of the narrowest victories in presidential election
history, defeating Nixon in twenty-three key states, but by a popular margin of
only 113,000 votes. The results left Eisenhower depressed; he viewed
Kennedy's victory as a "repudiation" of his eight years in the W hite House. But
the President's contributions to the campaign, according to his biographer, had
been "worse than u n helpful-it actually cost Nixon votes, and probably the
election."®®
Foreign policy had been central to JFK's theme of "getting the country
moving again" and to Nixon's theme of "experience," and the m ilitant tone of
the dual campaigns demonstrated that fervent anti-communism was the only
viable foreign policy position to take in U.S. presidential politics. But on
election day that issue was not the most decisive to undecided voters. The
handling of domestic issues proved more definitive, and here, Kennedy's ability
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to minimize his biggest handicap and his decision to balance the ticket with a
southerner proved brilliant. Kennedy advisor Theodore C. Sorenson concluded
that "The single factor influencing more swing-voters...was not unemployment
or foreign policy...but Kennedy's religion."®’ The combination of Catholic
Democrats and those Protestants w illin g to overlook Kennedy's religion, who
had voted Republican in 1956, more than offset the number of votes lost on
that issue in 1960. Furthermore, Kennedy's investment in the Johnson vice
presidential nomination also paid handsome dividends as the ticket swept the
Deep South including a reversal o f thirty-four crucial electoral votes Eisenhower
collected in Louisiana and Texas in 1956.
Despite the narrowness o f his election victory, Kennedy enjoyed
widespread popularity throughout all three years of his presidency. In many
respects this was quite remarkable given ongoing crises at home, in places like
Oxford, Mississippi, and Birmingham, Alabama, and abroad in Germany,
Vietnam, and Cuba. In early 1963, Kennedy had begun to look forward to his
reelection bid the follow ing year, and "within the confines of the W hite House
predicted - - and fervently hoped - - that Barry Goldwater would be nominated"
by the Republicans. Kennedy and Goldwater had become acquainted in the
Senate in 1952 and they developed a genuine friendship over the years, but the
two men "stood diametrically opposed [to each other]...on every major issue."
By autumn 1963, Senator Goldwater, who in only his second term as senator
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had become a leader of his party's conservative wing, also looked forward to a
high profile ideological contest against Kennedy. The President foresaw one of
the "most interesting...campaigns...in a long time" and anticipated "a hard,
close fight" in most states.®^ Kennedy began his campaign planning early and
eagerly anticipated a revival of the 1960 presidential debates. Even his fateful
trip to Texas in November 1963 had been a thinly disguised campaign trip.
After Kennedy's untimely death, his successor, Lyndon Johnson carefully
channelled the nation's grief into support for major federal legislation. The
Texan's application of presidential power in 1964 was both graceful and
effective, and consequently ensured his own presidential nomination for the
Democratic Party. Johnson's ascendance to the presidency appalled GOP frontrunner Barry Goldwater, who reversed his decision to run for the Republican
nomination. Preliminary polling data suggested that the fight for the GOP
nomination would be difficult for all contenders, and that President Johnson
would likely trounce any Republican candidate. But the ideological challenge
proved too tantalizing to the independent Goldwater, w ho in a relatively short
career in government had established an impressive track record of achieving
upset political victories. Encouraged by considerable support for his candidacy
which had been mounting for several years, the Arizonan threw his hat into the
ring.
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CHAPTER 4

THE RISE OF A MAVERICK:
Barry Morris Goldwater, 1909-1963

The son of an Arizona dry-goods merchant, Barry M. Goldwater was born
in 1909. As a youth, he went east to attend Staunton M ilitary Academy in
Lexington, Virginia, where he graduated in the middle o f his class. Young
Goldwater excelled in athletics and earned satisfactory grades. After graduation
in 1928, he returned to his native state and enrolled at the University of
Arizona in Tucson. The follow ing year his father, Baron Goldwater, died, and
shortly thereafter Barry left college to begin a career in the family's department
store, aptly named Goldwaters. Much to his regret, Goldwater never returned
to college and later confessed that it was "the biggest mistake of my life."®®
In 1934 he married Margaret "Peggy" Johnson, the daughter of the wealthy Ray
Prescott Johnson, President of Warner Gear Company. W ithin two years the
Goldwaters celebrated the birth of their first child, Joanne. Eventually they
would raise four children, two boys and two girls.
Goldwater, described as a "master merchandiser," applied ingenuity and
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natural sales ability to the family business and in 1937 became president of the
company.®'* He was proud of the firm's relative success during the Depression
and boasted "we didn't fire anybody....We never sued anyone....We never
missed a payroll."®® Goldwater was also active outside o f the family business;
he enjoyed outdoor photography, reading, and tinkering w ith machinery and
radios. He became an accomplished aviator, and in 1940 he published the first
of several books on Arizona entitled, lournev Down the River o f Canvons.
During the summer of 1941, Goldwater foresaw direct U.S. intervention in
W orld War II and vigorously supported the war m obilization effort as chairman
of the M ilitary Affairs Committee of the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce. He
hoped ultimately to fly fighter planes in the Army A ir Corps, but his request
was denied as the military "took a dim view in those days of 32-year-olds with
astigmatism."®®
Determined to serve in the Air Corps, Goldwater arranged for a first
lieutenant's commission and was assigned as an air-to-air gunnery instructor at
training stations in Phoenix and Yuma, Arizona. After the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, Goldwater seized an opportunity to fly non-combat cargo planes
in the China-Burma-lndia theater w ith the A ir Corps Ferry Command. Despite
repeated requests for transfer to the Bombing Command, Goldwater never

94

Dean Smith, The Goldwaters O f A rizona (Flagstaff, AZ, 1986), 185.

®®Barry M . G oldwater, W ith No Apologies: The Personal and Political M em oirs of U nited States
Senator Barrv M . G oldw ater (New York, 1979), 26.
96

Jack Bell, M r. Conservative: Barrv G oldw ater (Garden City, NY, 1962), 52.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

58

engaged in direct combat. By the end of the war, he had been promoted to
lieutenant colonel and served a brief stint as a pilot instructor in southern
California before returning to Arizona. At the request of the Arizona governor,
Goldwater helped organize and command the local A ir National Guard.®''
M ilitary service had a pronounced effect on Goldwater. It had exposed
him to problems outside of Arizona and intensified his interest in w orld affairs,
which until then had been largely influenced by voracious reading of materials
such as F.A. von Hayek's The Road To Serfdom and Carl von Clausewitz's On
W ar. Goldwater believed that U.S. isolationism after the first w orld war had
contributed to the outbreak of W orld War II and that future wars could only be
prevented through a commitment to military superiority. He was also
developing perspectives on domestic issues. Here the primary influence came
from his uncle Morris Goldwater, an Arizona pioneer, w ho served as mayor of
Prescott for more than thirty years. Morris had also participated in the Arizona
territorial government and was a founding member of the state's Democratic
party. Goldwater described his uncle as a Jeffersonian Democrat who
denounced high taxation and large central government.®®
After the war Goldwater resumed his management duties at the family
stores, working w ith his younger brother Robert. But these business
responsibilities became mundane; and he actively pursued many outside
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interests including the U.S. Interior Department's Advisory Commission on
Indian Affairs, the Arizona Interstate Stream Commission, the Colorado River
Commission, the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce, the YMCA and the Boy
Scouts of America. In 1949 Goldwater successfully ran for the Phoenix City
Council on a nonpartisan reform platform. The forty-year-old claimed that his
election victory had resulted from his "straight talk" and added that "Westerners
often admire a man more for standing tall than being right."®® In 1950, he
played a crucial role in the Arizona gubernatorial campaign of Republican
radio broadcaster J. Howard Pyle. As Pyle's campaign manager, he logged
more than 20,000 flight miles across the state and earned the respect and
admiration of Arizona's Republican Party leaders. Goldwater interpreted Pyle's
narrow upset victory as the first major step toward transforming historically
Democratic Arizona into a legitimate two party state.’®®
The follow ing year Goldwater won reelection to the Phoenix City Council.
After having successfully "driven crime underground" and "balanced the city
budget," he concluded that Arizona's Republicans needed to mount an
aggressive campaign for the United States Senate against the entrenched
Democratic incumbent, Ernest W. McFarland.’®’ In 1952 Goldwater
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announced his candidacy and embarked on a "spur-of-the-moment,
understaffed operation."’®® Concerned about her husband's entrance into
national politics, Peggy Goldwater cautioned that he was "too direct and
candid to be successful in politics" and that he would "get hurt and
disillusioned w ith the endless promises and compromises needed to
survive."’®® But Councilman Goldwater was determined to become a U.S.
senator, and he eagerly began his crusade against the Democratic Party and the
burgeoning federal government.
On the campaign trail the senatorial candidate declared that he was "fed
up" w ith Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, "the ballooning federal government,"
and Harry Truman's "no-win policy in Korea." Goldwater's 1952 campaign
exhibited the style and many of the issues that would characterize his bid for
the presidency twelve years later. He called for stronger states' rights, a
balanced budget, and a "better-directed" military force to oppose international
communism.’®" He demanded that McFarland "accept his share o f the
responsibility" for the thousands of American troops w ho had been killed,
wounded, or captured in Korea.’®®
Late in the campaign w hile in Prescott, Goldwater was urged by his
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manager, Steve C. Shadegg, to read his speech in order to avoid any
"spontaneous one-liners" that could be negatively portrayed by the media.
Goldwater said that he used one-liners because they "seemed to get us more
publicity."’®®Years later this natural tendency would haunt him as a
presidential candidate, but in 1952 Goldwater's political tim ing was exquisite
since his bid for the Senate coincided w ith the presidential campaign of Dwight
D. Eisenhower. In November, Eisenhower swept into the W hite House, and in
a surprise outcome Goldwater became only the second Republican senator
elected from Arizona since its admission to the Union in 1912. Ike had
defeated Adlai Stevenson in Arizona by 43,000 votes, w hile Goldwater, with
the help of more than fifty-thousand registered Democrats, won by the narrow
margin of 7,000 votes.’®®
As a forty-four-year-old freshman senator, the Arizonan aspired to a seat on
either the Interior or the Armed Services Committee, but Senate Republican
leader Robert A. Taft instead appointed him to the Labor and Public Welfare
Committee and to the Commerce and Banking Committee. Taft believed that
Goldwater's business experience would enhance Republican influence in both
legislative bodies. These appointments allowed the freshman senator input on
important domestic legislation such as federal aid to education, minimum wage
rates, and public welfare expenditures. As a member of the Labor Committee,
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Goldwater became a vocal critic of allegedly corrupt union labor leaders. In
Arizona, as a tacit supporter of Taft-Hartley, he had helped champion right-towork legislation, and he steadfastly opposed compulsory political contributions
by union workers. His appointment to the Labor Committee outraged powerful
labor leaders such as Walter P. Reuther of the United Auto Workers and James
R. Hoffa of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.’®®
As an adjunct to his seat on Labor, Goldwater was named to the Select
Committee To Investigate Improper Activities in Labor/Management Relations,
also known as the McClellan Rackets Committee. The subcommittee's attempts
to expose union corruption prompted national media attention, including live
television coverage. Fellow senator John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert,
acting as the group's chief council, waged a "merciless" fight against
Hoffa.’®® Meanwhile, Goldwater and other senators directed their efforts at
Reuther. Their battles made national headlines for a year, and the outspoken
Arizonan received more than 15,000 letters from rank and file union members
complaining about corruption. The Senate investigations frequently became
emotional and occasionally personal. Reuther once told reporters that
Goldwater was a "political hypocrite and a moral coward."” ®The senator
responded by challenging the union leader to a televised debate and
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proclaimed that Reuther was "the most dangerous man in the w o rld ."” ’
During this period, Goldwater established a genuine friendship w ith the junior
senator from Massachusetts, a relationship that continued throughout Kennedy's
final days in the White House.
Goldwater also formed a relationship w ith fellow Republican committee
member Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin. As a staunch anti
communist, the Arizona senator naturally aligned himself w ith the crusading
McCarthy. Although Goldwater "often winced at...[McCarthy's] excesses and
his indiscriminate charges of traitorous behavior," he remained loyal to
McCarthy to the end, even pleading w ith him to sign a letter of apology to
avoid censure in 1954.” ®Goldwater criticized those Republicans who
advocated censure, which the Arizonan viewed as a triumph for communism.
In 1955, w ith only two years experience in the Senate, Goldwater's GOP
peers appointed him chairman of the Republican Senatorial Campaign
Committee, since, as he said, "no one wanted the job." His primary
responsibility was to assist Republican senatorial candidates in their election
campaigns. Goldwater called it "a grueling, unrewarding, unglamorous job,"
but campaigning for other Republicans across the nation enabled him to
espouse his conservative ideology.” ®As w ith his initial disappointment when
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named to the labor and banking committees, the Senate campaign post
unexpectedly enhanced Goldwater's political career. For two years he
crisscrossed the country giving hundreds of speeches on the virtues of
Republican conservatism covering both domestic and international affairs. The
Arizonan criticized federal bureaucracy and the expanding national debt and
denounced massive foreign aid programs, particularly those benefitting nations
w ithin the Soviet sphere of influence. Goldwater could hardly have planned a
more advantageous first term in the Senate. As a result of his varied committee
appointments he participated in the development of important domestic
legislation and gained national prominence w ithin the Republican Party.” "
Goldwater's activities on the Senate labor committees appeared aggressive
and independent, but it was his disagreements w ith President Eisenhower that
cast him as a maverick and a renegade. The freshman senator voted against the
President's nomination of Charles Bohlen as Ambassador to the Soviet Union
and voted for the Bricker amendment, which was designed to curtail the
Executive's authority in foreign affairs. His public criticisms of the
administration were politically risky, as Ike remained extremely popular w ith
voters throughout his tenure. One of Goldwater's earliest differences w ith the
President involved the appointment of California governor Earl Warren as Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. The senator considered Warren too liberal,
asserting "I can forget the argument that California and Arizona have over
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water. I can forget that Earl Warren hasn't practiced law for twenty-five years.
But I can't forget that as governor he always recommended programs of the
welfare state variety."” ®Goldwater's criticism of certain planks in the 1957
Civil Rights Act and his call for the resignation of presidential advisor Sherman
Adams also infuriated Eisenhower. But the senator's most notorious
disagreement with the administration concerned the President's 1957 $71.8
billion budget proposal, the largest in peacetime history. In April 1957 from the
Senate floor, the Arizonan proclaimed that the budget "not only shocks me, but
it weakens my faith in the...administration. What is bad under the leadership of
one party cannot possibly be good under the leadership of the other."” ®
Goldwater later characterized Ike's budget proposal as a "Dime store New
Deal."” ®
Throughout his first term in the Senate the maverick senator had honored
his campaign pledge to provide "straight talk" for his constituents, and w ithout
the support of his popular president, Goldwater ran for reelection in 1958.
Former Senator Ernest W. McFarland, once again provided the opposition.
McFarland, w ho had remained a viable political force in Arizona by ousting
Howard Pyle as governor in 1956, was favored in the polls throughout most of
the election. Goldwater mounted an aggressive and expensive reelection
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campaign. Earlier that year, the United Auto Workers union had announced
that its chief political objective in 1958 was to ensure the defeat of Arizona's
Republican senator. Goldwater and his campaign manager, Stephen C.
Shadegg, immediately recognized the union's pronouncement as a "political
situation demanding exploitation."” ® Capitalizing on his image as a foe of
union corruption, Goldwater successfully linked the Democratic Party and
Governor McFarland to the allegedly corrupt Walter Reuther and the UAW.
Biographer Jack Bell claimed that the senator purposely avoided debate on
specific issues during the campaign and instead chose to "flail the phantom
figure of Walter Reuther...and to batter 'socialism'."” ® Goldwater reminded
older constituents of his support for increased social security benefits and the
general electorate of his successful battles for a balanced budget. He also clung
to his senatorial record as an opponent of "the Super-State" and extolled his
independence from "me-too" Republicanism.’ ®®
Goldwater also utilized foreign affairs in his reelection bid, comparing six
years of accomplishments under Eisenhower's leadership to the scandals and
uncertain policies of the Truman administration. He asked his audiences to
recall that Democratic leadership had led to the communization o f Eastern
Europe and China and to the death of American troops in Korea. In contrast, he
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claimed that the GOP had rebuilt the nation's defense forces w ith the Strategic
Air Command's jet bombers and the Navy's new fleet of nuclear submarines.
At the same time, he boasted of his strident opposition to foreign aid for
communist or neutral governments, and even of his reluctance to aid the
French in their war against communist insurgents in Southeast Asia unless
France made "satisfactory assurances" that it would "free" Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia.’^’
The w ell organized and highly publicized Goldwater campaign attracted
national media attention and substantial contributions from wealthy
conservatives including Texas oil man H.L. Hunt and H ollywood mogul Cecil
B. DeMille. As in the 1952 campaign, the Elect Goldwater Committee outspent
its opposition by nearly two to one and w ith the assistance of more than
80,000 Arizona Democrats, Goldwater's margin of victory in 1958 increased
from 7,000 to 35,000 votes. Stephen Shadegg later characterized the election
as the major "turning point" in senator's political career.’ ^^ Goldwater's
increased margin o f victory in an overwhelmingly Democratic state had
demonstrated his personal appeal to voters. His success could no longer be
dismissed as a product of Eisenhower's coattails.
Upon his triumphant return to Washington, Goldwater enjoyed new
prominence as the ranking minority member on the labor committees and
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moved from sixth to third position on Interior and Insular Affairs. He quickly
reestablished his maverick credentials in April 1959 by casting the sole
dissenting vote in the Senate against the Kennedy-Ervin labor reform bill.
Kennedy promptly remarked that it was "obvious that Senator Goldwater would
be satisfied w ith no bill that did not destroy the organized trade union
movement in the United S ta te s .E is e n h o w e r's investigation into
Goldwater's claims that the bill was largely ineffective against union corruption
and secondary boycotts resulted in a televised presidential speech that
denounced the measure as inadequate. The Senate later reversed its approval of
the Kennedy-Ervin bill, and in September 1959 an amended House bill,
Landrum-Griffen, emerged from conference as law. According to Shadegg,
"Every knowledgeable politician in America recognized that Barry Goldwater
was the one man responsible for this legislative turnabout."’ ^'*
After considerable prodding by fellow conservatives, Goldwater accepted
reappointment as chairman of the Senatorial Campaign Committee follow ing a
two-year layoff. In his absence the Republicans had lost thirteen Senate seats,
due primarily to the 1958 recession and the party's advocacy of right-to-work
legislation. Just as Goldwater's intensive campaigning for Howard Pyle in 1952
had become a self-promoting affair, his relentless efforts as reelection chairman
had begun to transform him into a popular national figure. His speeches
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remained familiar. He denounced large federal government and endorsed a
powerful military to resist the spread of communism. The senator was
described as a new party leader w ho had come "out of the West like a
refreshing breeze. His language was rough...candor shocking...[and] sincerity
beyond reproach. He was the Viceroy independent thinker, the Marlboro
man."’^s
After he delivered a rousing speech at the Western Republican Conference
in November 1959, the Los Angeles Times requested that the senator
contribute a tri-weekly newspaper column. Goldwater accepted the offer and
w ithin two years the column, entitled "H ow Do You Stand, Sir?," had been
syndicated to 148 newspapers. Persuaded by fellow Republicans to write a
book "setting forth in simple terms the basic conservative political philosophy,"
Goldwater published The Conscience O f A Conservative w ith the assistance of
Notre Dame law professor Dean Clarence and National Review editor L. Brent
Bozell in the spring of 1960.’^® Based largely on his campaign stump
speeches, the 123 page w ork outlined basic conservative principles and their
relation to domestic and international affairs. According to Goldwater, this
"unpretentious book" became a "symbol of a new political consciousness" and
a "rallying cry of the right against three decades of Franklin D. Roosevelt and
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the liberal agenda."'^'' W ith only 10,000 copies published during the first
printing, no one could have imagined that sales would eventually exceed four
m illion.
The book provided a succinct compilation of the senator's political views
and served as a landmark contribution to the "Goldwater image." The senator
criticized big government as a threat to the freedom of individual citizens. His
narrow interpretation of the tenth amendment, "a prohibitory rule of law" that
recognized the states' jurisdiction in areas not specifically addressed in the
Constitution, led him to oppose federal spending programs for education,
public housing, and agriculture subsidies.’ ^ The tenth amendment reads in
part; "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor
prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.'"^® Consequently, Goldwater believed that many federal spending
programs were unconstitutional and that state and local governments working
with private citizens' groups should assume responsibility for various services.
The last third of the book, under the heading "The Soviet Menace,"
echoed Goldwater's first comprehensive foreign policy address on the Senate
floor given on March 15, 1960. He proclaimed that the United States was in
"imminent danger" from communism and called for outright "victory" in the
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Cold War. He prescribed m ilitary superiority and an aggressive foreign policy
to prevent the establishment of a "universal Communist Empire." Goldwater
favored withdrawing diplom atic recognition of the Soviet Union and demanded
a réévaluation of U.S. participation in the United Nations. The senator sharply
criticized U.S. foreign aid, particularly aid to communist countries like Poland
and Yugoslavia and to non-aligned countries such as India and Indonesia. He
believed that the United States had no right or obligation to "promote the
economic and social welfare of foreign peoples"; however, he advocated
military and technical aid to "friendly" anti-communist countries such as South
Vietnam. Goldwater also argued for the resumption of nuclear testing,
explaining that "tests are needed to develop tactical nuclear weapons for
possible use in limited wars." In the book's conclusion, Goldwater
acknowledged that his recommendations were "hard counsel" but that "war
may be the price of freedom.
The popularity of his book and newspaper column helped to complete the
transformation of Goldwater's reputation as a maverick senator from a sparsely
populated state to that of a prominent national leader of the growing
conservative movement. Arizona's junior senator capitalized on his new
popularity by using his speaking tours to support the 1960 Republican
presidential nomination of Richard M. Nixon, whom he deemed more
conservative than the Vice President's rival. New York governor Nelson A.
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Rockefeller. In the spring of 1960, Goldwater's rising popularity was manifest
at the GOP's South Carolina state convention where the Arizonan was the
keynote speaker. The state's delegates responded so enthusiastically to his
address that they voted to nominate Goldwater over Nixon for the presidency.
The senator quickly informed Nixon of the circumstances and assured him that
he fully backed the Vice President's candidacy.^’
Nixon eventually won the Republican nomination but not before a late
compromise w ith Rockefeller on the GOP p l a t f o r m . H e had agreed to
emphasize a stronger defense policy and new planks favoring civil rights,
federal aid to education and opposing right-to-work legislation. Conservatives
felt betrayed by the platform's new language and Nixon's reversal on the labor
issue particularly upset Goldwater who wrote in his diary, "The man is a twofisted, four-square liar." The senator characterized Nixon's action as
"appeasement" of the party's liberal wing and referred to the meeting as "an
American M u n i c h . T h e Nixon-Rockefeller pact solidified the right w ing at
the 1960 Republican convention and revitalized support for a Goldwater
presidential nomination. South Carolina continued to pledge its votes in favor
of the senator; and Texas threatened to bolt Nixon. In an effort to promote
party unity, Goldwater asked all delegates to relinquish their support for his
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candidacy. Nonetheless, the South Carolina delegation voted for Goldwater,
which gave the senator the opportunity to address the convention. He took the
stage and officially w ithdrew his nomination and repeated his call for a unified
party, but the senator also prodded Republican conservatives to "get to work if
we want to take this party back-1 think we can."“ " Many observers,
including Stephen Shadegg, have concluded that the crowd's enthusiastic
reaction to Goldwater's speech ignited the movement for his presidential
nomination in 1964. Regardless, Goldwater delivered more than one-hundred
campaign speeches for the Republican ticket. He frequently relayed strategy
recommendations to the Nixon campaign staff, often pleading for the candidate
to take a hawkish stand on foreign policy. On October 27, 1960, the Arizonan
sent a telegram to the nominee stating, "They want to hear a tough attitude
toward Russia - - an attitude that might run the risk of war but which would
guarantee us a fight for our freedom instead of the slow dribbling away such as
the Democrats have been doing at Versailles, Potsdam, Yalta, Tehran, and
K o r e a . W h e n the Republicans narrowly lost to John F. Kennedy in
November, Goldwater blamed Nixon's reluctance to fu lly involve President
Eisenhower in the campaign and the Vice President's failure to rally
conservative voters.
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Shortly after the election, Goldwater's second term as chairman of the
Senatorial Campaign Committee expired. Despite the fact that all GOP senators
had successfully run for reelection in 1960, several liberal committee members
including Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York opposed his reappointment on
ideological grounds. Goldwater received unexpected support from Senator
Margaret Chase Smith of Maine. W hile acknowledging a "substantial
divergence" in their views. Smith favored his reappointment because he had
demonstrated "an ability and a determination to do everything he could to get
every Republican nominee elected regardless of whether he agreed or
disagreed w ith the views of the individual candidate."“ ^ W ith Smith's
endorsement, Goldwater undertook his third, two-year term as chairman.
Due largely to his committee assignments, Goldwater's first eight years in
the Senate had focused primarily on the nation's domestic agenda. A noticeable
shift towards foreign affairs began a week after the 1960 elections when the
senator accepted an invitation to deliver a foreign policy speech at the Air War
College in Montgomery, Alabama. The speech provided the basis for his
subsequent positions on foreign affairs.” ®Goldwater stated that "where
conflicts arise, they must always be resolved in favor of achieving the
indispensable condition for a tolerable world - - the absence of Soviet
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Communist power."” ® He proclaimed the global pursuit of freedom, justice,
peace, and prosperity the objects of U.S. foreign policy, but declared them
secondary to containing the Soviet Union:
Peace is a worthy objective. But if we must choose between peace and keeping the
Communists out of Berlin, then we must fight. Freedom...is a worthy objective. But if granting
self-determination to the Algerian rebels entails sweeping that area into the Soviet orbit, then
Algerian freedom must be postponed. Justice is a worthy objective, but if justice for the Bantus
entails driving the government of the Union of South Africa away from the West, then the
Bantus must be prepared to carry their identification cards yet awhile longer. Prosperity is a
worthy objective, but if providing higher standards of living gets in the way of producing
sufficient guns to resist communist aggression, then material sacrifices and denials w ill have to
be made.“ °

Goldwater advocated the anti-communist containment strategy designed
by Truman and the brinkmanship tactics employed by Eisenhower, and he
rejected calls for disarmament negotiations as counterproductive to a "peace
through strength" policy. The senator warned the m ilitary officers that, "Free
institutions and free governments are being challenged by an implacable foe
dedicated to their destruction. If we renounce in advance the right to resist
Communist aggression w ith military strength, we have in effect lost the battle
and are merely waiting to arrange the terms of surrender."” ' Goldwater
attacked President-elect Kennedy for substantiating inaccurate charges of a
decline in U.S. missile superiority and for placing too much importance on
international perceptions o f American prestige. He concluded w ith a call for
the removal of the Castro regime and moderate praise for the United Nations,
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but warned that U.S. foreign policy should never be subordinated to the world
organization.
Goldwater's growing influence in the conservative w ing of the GOP was
obvious in John G. Tower's election to Senate in the spring of 1961. The
candidate had rejected Nixon's offer to campaign on his behalf in favor of
Goldwater's direct endorsement. Tower, a young conservative, filled the seat
vacated by Lyndon Johnson who had become vice president. The first
Republican senator elected from Texas since Reconstruction, Tower's upset
victory not only boosted Goldwater's national influence but demonstrated the
increasing popularity of the conservative movement. Democratic Senator
W illiam Proxmire of Wisconsin commented that the Arizonan had developed a
"most surprising personal follow ing in my own state" and that "letters praising
Goldwater come to me almost as frequently as letters in praise of
Kennedy."” ^
Goldwater's importance was also evident on April 15, 1961, when
President Kennedy called him to the W hite House for counsel on the proposed
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Goldwater sensed Kennedy's reluctance to order
U.S. air cover during the operation and was shocked that the President might
"abandon" the exiled Cubans. He advised the President to "do whatever is
necessary" to assure a successful invasion. When Goldwater left the W hite
House, he was certain that Kennedy would order U.S. forces to assist in the
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invasion, but the American military did not intervene and the Cuban exiles
were easily repelled. The Cuban debacle cast a shadow over the new
administration's ability to conduct foreign affairs.” ® Goldwater and many
others, including former President Eisenhower, were sure that Kennedy's
inaction would be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of weakness.” " The
senator later insisted that during this April meeting he, not Kennedy, had
possessed the "toughness of mind and w ill to lead the country."” ®
Attempting to capitalize on the administration's vulnerability in
international affairs, Goldwater freely criticized the direction o f U.S. foreign
policy from his new position on the Senate Armed Services Committee. His
second major book W hv Not Victorv? was devoted exclusively to foreign
policy and expanded on the ideas presented at the A ir W ar College. Goldwater
wrote:
I am not calling for return to the naked power of politics of the nineteenth century. I am not
asking that we declare hot war on Russia or turn a deaf ear to the pleas of help from destitute
nations. I am w illing to be as modern as anyone as long as modernism does not constitute a
debasing of our traditional values. But if to be modern I must accede to policies that would
turn the foreign affairs of the United States over to the United Nations, disarm our great military
machine, welcome Red China into the Committee of Nations, give away our food and
technical skills to the so-called neutralist nations, and get nothing in return...if this is what is
meant, then indeed I am not modern and never want to be.'“
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Conservatives praised the book. The W all Street journal commented that,
"Goldwater attacks the heart of various w orld problems, and most o f the time
his logic is irrefutable."” '' The Saturday Review printed contrasting reviews
from two political analysts. Raymond Mo ley argued that the senator was an
"authentic statesman" and that the book contained nothing fanatical; rather "It
is a reasoned analysis of the failures of foreign policy under the party that he
opposes." Mo ley's counterpart, Walter Johnson, assailed Goldwater for
distorting the positions of his opponents and for reveling in the "fundamentalistrevivalistic technique of using emotion-laden words." He concluded that
Goldwater was an "Un-Modern Republican" w ith "uncomplicated" views on
foreign policy.” ®The New York Times succinctly concluded that W hv Not
Victorv contained "the purest of Goldwaterism" that offered "sweet music" to
Goldwater supporters, although his opponents were likely to "cry horror."” ®
The book's extensive m ilitant language contributed to the senator's emerging
image as a warmonger. He warned that "Time is running out" in the war
against communism:
Providence has imposed upon us the task of leading the free world's fight to stay free. We must
be ready to fight all sorts of wars-brush fires as well as nuclear. We need weapons for both
limited and the unlimited war. We must-unfortunately-continue to build bigger weapons until
the Communist menace has subsided. We must go on the offensive....proclaim victory as our
aim and then press boldly and unremittingly on all fronts. Our job, first and foremost, is to
persuade the enemy that we would rather follow the world to Kingdom Come than consign it
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to Hell under communism.

In the summer of 1961, Senator J. W illiam Fulbright of Arkansas, the
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, began to challenge
Goldwater's views on foreign affairs in a series of speeches from the Senate
floor: "voices are saying...that the United States is the strongest country in the
world, and should not hesitate to commit its strength to the active defense of
its policies anywhere outside the Communist empire. This is dangerous
doctrine."” ’ Fulbright supported peaceful co-existence in the Cold War, a
policy that relied on negotiation and compromise w ith the Soviets.” ®To the
Arizonan, peaceful co-existence was the antithesis of conservative foreign
policy. He described policy under Kennedy and Fulbright as aimless and timid
and called for new aggressive action to defeat the expanding communist
menace. W orld peace, he maintained, was obtainable only through
demonstrative power. Fulbright chided Goldwater and called upon him to
explain the meaning of "total victory" in the Cold War and asked how it could
be achieved "in this age of ideological conflict and nuclear weapons."” ®
Goldwater defined "victory" in W hv Not Victorv?:
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If there is doubt as to what victory in the Communist War means, let me say that it means the
opposite of defeat; it means freedom instead of slavery; it means the right of every man to
worship God; of nations to determine their own destiny free of force and coercion. Victory in
the Communist War means the sum total of all the hopes of free men throughout the world. It
means human dignity, freedom of choice, the right to work. And it means peace with honor for
men who prize liberty and do not fear death. Those who argue against any use of strength,
against any military risk, against any unilateral action fail to understand that political victory in
the Communist War is the only way to avoid a strictly military solution of the East-West
crisis."""

Goldwater's call for direct resistance to communist expansion was realized
in October 1962. In a televised address. President Kennedy announced a
military blockade of Cuba and demanded the immediate removal of Soviet
nuclear missiles from the island.” ® Nearly two-hundred American ships and
aircraft, some armed w ith nuclear weapons, were deployed to the Caribbean.
The crisis subsided six tense days later when the Soviets agreed to remove the
missiles and the U.S. promised not to invade Cuba. Despite its favorable
resolution, the brinkmanship of the Cuban missile crisis frightened many
Americans, a consequence that did not curtail Goldwater's militant rhetoric.
Kennedy's leadership during the Cuban crisis galvanized public support for his
administration and the Bay of Pigs fiasco seemed forgotten. The Democrats
were rewarded w ith a four seat gain in the November 1962 mid-term elections
which forced the Republicans to refocus their attention on regaining the White
House in 1964.” ®

“ "Goldwater, Whv Not Victorv. 153-54.
” ®For recent scholarship on the Cuban missile crisis see, James A. Nathan, ed.. The Cuban
Missile Crisis Revisited (New York, 1992).
” ®Harold Faber, ed.. The New York Times Election Handbook 1964 (New York, 1964) 36-39.
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According to a January 1963 Gallup Poll, half of the nation's Republican
and independent voters favored Nelson Rockefeller as the 1964 GOP
presidential nominee. Former Vice President Nixon's loss to Pat Brown in the
1962 California gubernatorial race had severely weakened support for his
renomination. Rockefeller maneuvered to neutralize opposition to his
nomination w ithin the party.” ®As the leader of the Republican Party's
minority conservative wing, Goldwater met w ith Governor Rockefeller on
several occasions to discuss "party and policy problems." By the spring of
1963, Goldwater concluded that the governor "had moved to the right," and to
the surprise of many, he announced a preference for Rockefeller over two other
potential nominees, Nixon and political newcomer Governor George Romney
of Michigan.” ®
Confidence in Rockefeller's leadership declined sharply in May 1963,
when the governor's recent divorce and subsequent remarriage became public.
News coverage of the marriage and his new wife's supposed abandonment of
her children from her previous marriage generated tremendous negative mail.
Rockefeller's popularity in the presidential polls plummeted, w hile support for
Goldwater and Romney soared. A published report detailing a survey of 382
Republican leaders indicated that "the Goldwater tide is rising high" and that

” ®Mlchael Kramer and Sam Roberts, "I Never W anted To Be V ice President O f A nything!" An
Investigative Biograohv o f Nelson Rockefeller (N ew York, 1976), 266-71.
” ®Goldwater and Casserly Goldw ater. 176-77.
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he was "far out in front" of all other potential candidates.” ® Rumors
circulated that Rockefeller blamed Goldwater for the hate mail received from
right w ing conservative groups. Their newfound friendship disintegrated as
quickly as it had formed. Throughout the summer of 1963, Rockefeller
condemned right w ing extremists for attempting to take over the Republican
Party and threatened not to support a Goldwater presidential bid if the senator
were captured by the "radical right."” ®
A "Draft Goldwater Committee" had been in full operation for nearly two
years. The independent organization led by F. Clifton W hite, a Republican
campaign organizer from New York, had worked nationally to recruit
conservative delegates at all levels of state and local government. On July 4,
1963, the committee organized a successful political rally of more than 8,000
supporters at the District of Columbia Stadium w ithout the participation or
endorsement o f its candidate. The Nation described the event as "every
Goldwater fan's dream of a Republican national convention" complete with
campaign placards that read "D O N 'T TARRY - GO BARRY" and "JFK - WE
WILL BARRY YO U ."” ' Senator John Tower and a cast o f H ollywood
celebrities predicted a Goldwater presidential victory before an enthusiastic
crowd. As a result of his untiring devotion to the GOP, the Arizonan benefitted

'®®U.S. News & W o rld Report. July 15, 1963, 41-43.
' “ G oldw ater and Casserlv G oldw ater. 182.
'^ 'Nation. July 27, 1963, 48.
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from widespread support among party officials at the county and state levels
and nationally from fellow senators Norris Cotton of New Hampshire, Carl
Curtis of Nebraska, Karl M undt of South Dakota, and congressmen Robert Dole
of Kansas, Melvin Laird of Wisconsin, and Robert Michel of Illinois. Although,
Goldwater had distanced himself from the organized effort and delayed public
announcement of his candidacy, he was outraged at Rockefeller's repeated
attacks and grew increasingly anxious to w in the Republican nomination and to
challenge his friend and political rival. Jack Kennedy. He believed that
Kennedy's vacillation in foreign affairs and support for "worn-out domestic
spending programs" made him vulnerable.'®®
During early October, Kennedy toured several western states and began
what the press interpreted as a series of pre-election campaign speeches.
According to the National Review, the public's reaction to Kennedy's speeches
confirmed the appeal of the "peace" issue and predicted that peace would be
"the #1 hot item" in his 1964 reelection campaign. The magazine further
forecast that the any GOP presidential nominee would "have to fight off the
accusation, 'Warmonger!'"'®® A week later a preliminary presidential election
poll indicated that Kennedy would command 55 percent of the vote compared
to 39 percent for Goldwater, w ith 6 percent undecided. But Goldwater's
personal popularity was reported at 45 percent and climbing; and a November

'®®Goldwater and Casserly, G oldw ater. 175.
'®®National Review. O ctober 22, 1963, 336.
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2, 1963, Associated Press poll of GOP state and county chairmen displayed
solid support for the senator's nomination. By contrast, Kennedy's national
approval rating had slipped from 70 percent in 1962 to its all time low of 59
percent.’®" The President believed that Texas, where his approval rating was
a dismal 38 percent, was crucial to his reelection in 1964 and the state became
an important stop on his Western tour.’ ®® Look magazine projected that
Goldwater could actually defeat Kennedy.’®® Conservative Republicans
concluded that even if outright victory were not probable in 1964, the contest
would at least be close and enable the right w ing to capture control of their
party.
Goldwater had planned to publicly announce his candidacy at the end of
November, but a sniper's bullet intervened in Dallas on November 22. The
Kennedy assassination stunned the nation and reversed Goldwater's decision to
run for president. He told friends that the thought of running against Vice
President Johnson was "abhorrent." Goldwater believed that there could be no
battles over issues w ith Johnson, who was "a dirty fighter" and a "master of
manipulation." But the groundswell for a Goldwater candidacy that had begun
at the 1960 GOP convention was overpowering, and under significant pressure

’®" George H. G allop, The G allop Poll: Public O p in io n . 1935-1971. vol. 3, 1959-1971 (New
York, 1972), 1847, 1850.
’ ®®Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives o f the President. 1963-1969 (New York,
1971), 6.
166

Look. O ctober 8, 1963, 36-37.
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from Senators Cotton, Curtis and other conservatives, Goldwater relented,
predicting that it would be "an all-out bitter battle."” ®
In just twelve years Barry M. Goldwater had risen from an obscure
Phoenix city councilman to a legitimate presidential candidate. His immediate
success had resulted from a blend of candor, enthusiasm, conservative
ideology, and political good fortune. His exhaustive campaigning against
twenty years of Democratic leadership in domestic and foreign affairs surprised
his overconfident opponent in 1952, and the coinciding election of Republican
Dwight D. Eisenhower ensured Goldwater an upset victory. Once in the Senate
the Arizonan took advantage of prime committee appointments, and his
activities earned him a national reputation as a courageous, forthright, and
independent legislator. His constituents indicated their approval by reelecting
the maverick in 1958. During his second term, Goldwater emphasized the
necessity of "victory" in the Cold War and continued his fight against large
federal government. Gradually the Arizonan had emerged as the leader of the
Republican Party's conservative wing. By the summer of 1963, Goldwater
appeared a likely presidential nominee follow ing the political misfortunes of
the party's two more moderate leaders, Richard Nixon and Nelson Rockefeller.

"'®Goldwater and Casserly, G oldwater. 189, 191, 194.
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CHAPTER 5

BAPTISM BY FIRE;
Goldwater And The Drive
For The 1964 Republican Nomination

Before challenging Lyndon Johnson for the W hite House, Barry Goldwater
first had to capture the Republican nomination. During his eleven years in the
Senate, the Arizonan had established a reputation as the outspoken leader of
the party's minority conservative wing. He had frequently confronted fellow
Republicans, including President Dwight D. Eisenhower, on diverse domestic
and foreign policy issues. Despite his independence, Goldwater had earned the
respect and gratitude of many Republicans for his untiring efforts as chair of the
Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee. Still, senatorial gratitude was not
equivalent to general support. As he entered the primary campaign, Goldwater
remained the maverick leader of the GOP's minority faction, and the
nomination was far from a foregone conclusion.
New York governor Nelson A. Rockefeller provided Goldwater's principal
opposition. The wealthy and powerful governor represented the GOP's
influential eastern establishment which had supported the Eisenhower
administration and generally controlled the party's moderate wing. Rockefeller's
86
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presidential ambitions had been well publicized since he mounted a minor
challenge to Richard Nixon's nomination four years earlier. In 1964 the
governor campaigned as the party's mainstream candidate w ho supported a
strong national defense and moderate federal programs. Since the 1960 GOP
convention, the conservatives had gradually begun to dominate much of the
party's local and state machinery, and Goldwater's impressive grassroots
follow ing forced Rockefeller to attack the senator aggressively, characterizing
him as a dangerous extremist whose presidency would lead to nuclear war.
Goldwater largely ignored Rockefeller's candidacy and chose to campaign
against Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and Lyndon Johnson's Great Society.
Calling for victory in the Cold War, the senator also made foreign affairs a
primary issue and denounced the defense policies of Democratic presidents
Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson. Rockefeller's negative campaign
also helped to keep foreign affairs at the forefront of the primaries by seeking
to capitalize on Goldwater's imprudent, "shoot-from-the-hip" manner. The
relentless attacks on Goldwater proved so effective that the Democrats quickly
recognized the Arizonan's vulnerabilities and quietly hoped for a Goldwater
nomination.
On January 3, 1964, Barry Morris Goldwater, wearing blue jeans and an
old shirt and leaning on crutches because of recent foot surgery, officially
announced his candidacy for the GOP presidential nomination from his home
in Phoenix, Arizona. The outspoken Republican promised to lead the nation in
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a new direction by providing voters "a choice, not an echo."” ® Rather than
being just another "Me Too" Republican, Goldwater pledged to offer policy
alternatives distinct from those of rival GOP candidates and the Democratic
Party. The Arizonan embarked on an intense campaign that would divide the
Republicans so severely that the party was unable to mount a viable challenge
for the presidency.
January polling data indicated that popular support for party leadership
was generally divided among Goldwater, Rockefeller, Nixon and U.S.
Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and that none of the
Republicans w ould run w ell against Lyndon Johnson in the general election.
The absence of a predominant leader led to a rancorous fight over the 1964
GOP presidential nomination and for control of the party. O f the four leading
Republicans, only Goldwater and Rockefeller formally announced their
candidacies and actively campaigned for the nomination. Their first battles
were waged during January and February in New Hampshire.” ®
The New Hampshire primary carried the pledge of fourteen convention
delegates, but more importantly, the election would afford an early barometer
of the party's ideological direction and help designate party leadership. Early
polls comparing the two active candidates indicated an overwhelming
Goldwater lead; however, his popularity dissipated prim arily because of

’“ Barry M . G oldw ater and Jack Casserly, G oldw ater (New York, 1988), 197.
'®®Theodore H. W hite, The M aking O f The President 1964 (New York, 1965), 98-110.
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campaign controversies regarding his position on social security and foreign
affairs. In his opening press conference in Concord, Goldwater was asked to
comment on his position regarding the social security system. He stated that
the system was financially sound but that it could be improved by making the
program voluntary. When asked about the Castro regime in Cuba, the senator
said he w ould support another exile-led invasion of the island aided by U.S. air
power. The follow ing day the Concord Dailv M onitor published the headline;
"GOLDWATER SETS GOALS; END SOCIAL SECURITY, HIT CASTRO."” ®
The headline clearly distorted Goldwater's position, but his proclivity for
off-the-cuff remarks rather than adhering to formulated policy statements made
him susceptible to this type of misrepresentation. Furthermore, the senator's
comments on Cuba only reinforced his image as a warmonger. Earlier,
Goldwater had asserted that the NATO commander should have authority to
use tactical nuclear weapons to repel a Soviet attack on Western Europe.” ’
Such a policy, although largely unknown, had been implemented by the
Eisenhower administration and had been continued by Kennedy and Johnson.
Press representation of his position rankled voters because it suggested that
Goldwater w ould arbitrarily transfer control of United States nuclear weapons
to NATO field commanders. Journalists covering the Goldwater campaign
pounced on this type of material; and as one Associated Press reporter

’ ®°Robert D. Novak, The Aeonv O f The G.O.P.. 1964 (New York, 1965), 310.
’ ^’ W ashington Post. O ctober 25, 1963.
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remarked, "This was great. All we had to do was keep hitting him w ith
questions and then wait until he slipped and we had our headlines."” ®
Goldwater later accepted partial blame for these damaging incidents,
acknowledging that he should have used "more precise language, qualifying
what I said"; but he also faulted the press for careless and provocative
reporting.” ®Aside from the mistakes resulting from the Arizonan's "imprecise
frankness," his New Hampshire campaign was poorly executed. The "stop-inevery-snack-bar" handshaking expeditions overextended the candidate, whose
proven strength had been making carefully honed speeches to larger
groups.” " The senator subsequently admitted that the New Hampshire
primary served as a lesson in "how not to run a campaign."” ®
Comparatively, Rockefeller planned and conducted a more impressive
campaign, and according to one reporter, the governor "worked harder...and
had more fun than Goldwater."” ® He traversed the Granite State like a
quintessential politician. Goldwater biographer Jack Bell described him as a
"backslapper, an arm-around-the-shoulder and an all-smiles boy," who "tossed

” ®Karl Hess, In A Cause That W ill Trium ph: The G oldw ater Campaign and the Future of
Conservatism (N ew York, 1967), 26.
” ®Goldwater and Casserly, G oldw ater. 204.
” "Hess, In A Cause That W ill Trium ph. 27.
” ®Goldwater and Casserly, G oldw ater. 202.
” ®Charles M c D o w e ll, Jr., Campaign Fever: The National Folk Festival, from N ew Hampshire to
November. 1964. (N ew York, 1965), 30.
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off warmth like a New England stove."” ® Rockefeller successfully
implemented a strategy designed to capitalize on the mounting "Goldwater
image" as a reckless radical, w ho would cancel popular government programs
and risk nuclear war. According to a campaign journalist, the governor wanted
to "crystallize it, document it, light it dramatically, and develop it as the villain
of the piece."” ® But for all of Goldwater's woes. Rockefeller failed to
improve upon his own popularity w ith the electorate. Nearly 50 percent of
New Hampshire's voters remained undecided, and the New York governor was
dogged by the publicity surrounding his remarriage and the announcement of
his new wife's pregnancy.” ®
According to a New York Times survey, foreign affairs not Rockefeller's
personal life, had become the single most important issue to New Hampshire
voters.’®® Goldwater, who had been promoted to Major General in the Air
Force Reserve, was most responsible for bringing foreign policy to the forefront,
and Rockefeller and the press stood poised to seize on any of his unguarded
statements. The Arizonan proclaimed that the major objective of American
foreign policy should be "the reduction of communist power."’®’ In addition

’ ®®Jack Bell, M r. Conservative: Barrv G oldw ater (Garden City, NY, 1962), 300.
’ “ M cD o w e ll, Campaign Fever. 22.
’ ®®Novak, The Agonv. 322.
’®®N ew York Times. M arch 8, 1964.
' “’ G oldw ater Campaign Speech, San Francisco, California, February 12, 1964, Barrv Goldwater
Campaign Speeches V olum e I. p.7, Barry M . G oldw ater C ollection, A rizona Historical Foundation,
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to his stand on sharing control of nuclear weapons w ith NATO, Goldwater
advocated the reinstitution o f the Cuba blockade and the use of force against
Castro, who had recently cut off the fresh water supply to the Guantanamo
naval base.’®^ The senator also reaffirmed his willingness to withdraw
diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, and he recommended that the
United States leave the United Nations if the People's Republic of China were
ever admitted. Regarding Vietnam, both candidates criticized the Johnson
administration and U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. for "indecisive"
and "unclear" policies. The Arizonan claimed current Vietnam policy would
lead to "disaster" and that the United States could not "ignore hard choices in
Vietnam....[we must] either w in or w ithdraw ."’®® Goldwater regularly called
for a return to the foreign policies of Eisenhower and Dulles, who had
advocated "occasional brinkmanship" and the "proper use of force."’®"
Two days before the primary, the New York Times forecast a close
election and indicated that rising fears over Goldwater's positions on foreign
relations had benefitted a surging write-in campaign for New England favoriteson. Ambassador Lodge. The Times concluded that the senator's aggressiveness

Tempe, Arizona.
’®^According to historian W alter LeFeber, President Johnson gave a "superb performance" when
he developed an independent water supply for the installation and then later rejected a Castro offer
to turn the water back on. See LeFeber, "Latin American Policy," in The lohnson Years, vol. I, ed.
Robert A. D ivine, (Lawrence, KS, 1987), 71.
’®®N ew York Times. February 21, 1964.
’®"lbid., February 4, 1964.
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on foreign affairs "disturbs voters," and the paper quoted several New
Hampshire residents describing the senator as "a hot head" and "a nut."’®®
During the campaign's waning hours. Rockefeller stepped up his assault on
Goldwater, characterizing his views on foreign affairs as an invitation to "world
suicide" and the prospect o f entrusting the country to him as "appalling."’®®
Behind the scenes, the governor unsuccessfully urged the leaders of the Lodge
organization to abandon their efforts.
On March 10, 1964, some 90,000 New Hampshire voters plodded
through the snow to the voting booths and left political pundits astonished at
the outcome. W ithout officially announcing his candidacy or leaving Saigon,
write-in candidate Lodge w ith 33,000 votes soundly defeated both Goldwater
w ith 20,700 votes and Rockefeller w ith 19,500 votes. Interpreted as a rejection
of both Goldwater and Rockefeller, the New Hampshire results left the
direction of the party uncertain. Most analysts agreed that despite Lodge's upset
victory, his strong emergence in public opinion polls would prove temporary as
he lacked a coordinated national campaign and had no significant support
among state or county level Republican leaders. Observers further concluded
that the GOP w ould be forced to seek alternative candidates. Richard Nixon's
popularity among Republicans had remained fairly stable, and other frequently
mentioned potential nominees included Michigan governor George Romney

’ ®®lbid., M arch 8, 1964.
' “ Ibid., M arch 9, 1964.
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and Pennsylvania governor W illiam Scranton. Goldwater's defeat in New
Hampshire seemed to confirm columnist Joseph Alsop's contention that "No
serious Republican, even the most Neanderthal type, any longer takes
Goldwater seriously."’®^ The Goldwater staff regrouped in Washington,
promoting C liff W hite to co-director and enhancing Karl Hess' role as lead
speech w riter and general advisor to the campaign. Reassessing the New
Hampshire election during a television interview, the Arizonan concluded
bluntly, "I goofed."’®®
The next major primary elections were in Oregon and California. Unlike
New Hampshire, the May Oregon ballot included the names of all Republican
contenders regardless of whether they were announced candidates. The slate
listed Lodge, Nixon, Goldwater, Rockefeller, Scranton and Senator Margaret
Chase Smith of Maine. Senator Smith had begun a limited campaign designed
to demonstrate that it was plausible for a woman to run for the presidency.
Despite continued popularity in the polls. Lodge denied he was a candidate.
The Ambassador was soon visited in Vietnam by another undeclared candidate,
Richard Nixon. The former vice president was reportedly on a w orld tour as
legal counsel for the Pepsi-Cola Company; however, he managed to engage the
press in regular news conferences concerning American politics. Governor
Scranton publicly remained non-committal. Once again only Goldwater and

’ “’'M c D o w e ll, Campaign Fever. 30.
’““G oldw ater and Casserly, G oldw ater. 205.
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Rockefeller overtly solicited convention delegate support.’®®
Ambassador Lodge's New Hampshire victory and surge in opinion polls
expanded the visibility and importance of U.S. policy in Vietnam. W hile
campaigning in northern California in March, Goldwater predicted that U.S.
intervention in Vietnam would constitute a "battalion sized conflict" that
required a clearly stated purpose.’®® He demanded that Lodge return stateside
and report to Congress on the deteriorating conditions in South Vietnam. The
Arizona senator invoked Eisenhower's domino theory, proclaiming that all of
Southeast Asia would be lost to communism if Vietnam were not adequately
supported and suggested that direct attacks on North Vietnam "might be
advisable."’®’ In a televised address Goldwater insisted that U.S. m ilitary
intervention in Southeast Asia had resulted from President Johnson's indecisive
foreign policy leadership and told voters that "we can and we should end the
fighting in Viet Nam by taking the strong, affirmative action that w ould do just
that."’®® Rockefeller called for Lodge's resignation and for an explanation of
the failing U.S. policies in Vietnam. He also assailed Goldwater's pledge for
victory in Vietnam as "irresponsible" and "dangerous."’®® Unbeknownst to

’ ®®White. M aking O f The President. 111-15.
’ ®°N ew York Times. M arch 19, 1964.
’®'ibid., M arch 14, 1964.
’ ®®Goldwater National Television Broadcast, M ay 14,1964, Barrv G oldw ater Campaign Speeches
V olum e I. p .3, Barry M . G oldw ater C ollection, Arizona Historical Foundation, Tempe, Arizona.
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the candidates, President Johnson had already secretly approved Operation
Plan 34A, which the Pentagon Papers described as "an elaborate program of
covert m ilitary operations against the state of North Vietnam."’®"
Rockefeller stepped-up his attacks after Goldwater received the
endorsement of California's Republican Assembly for the state's June primary.
Rockefeller charged that right w ing extremists had infiltrated the California
GOP and that Goldwater remained out of the mainstream of the Republican
Party. The senator reacted to the accusations w ith a detailed recounting of his
Senate voting record, w hich reflected consistent support for Republican
initiatives. He dismissed the extremism charge as a "phantom issue."’®®
Concurrently, Oregon polling data indicated that Lodge and Rockefeller
held large leads over Goldwater, and on the advice of staff, the Arizonan
curtailed his personal appearances in the Northwest in order to concentrate his
efforts on delegate rich California. Rockefeller remained in Oregon to campaign
as the moderate GOP candidate and continued to lash the senator on the issues
of social security and foreign affairs. The governor contended that he was the
only candidate who cared enough about Oregon voters to campaign there.
Goldwater was faring equally badly in national polling contests where he
trailed both Lodge and Nixon. Still, it was party delegates not the general
public w ho nominated presidential candidates, and Goldwater supporters

’“"Pentagon Papers. (N ew York, 1972, N ew York Tim es-Bantam version), 263.
’““N ew York Times. A pril 1, 1964.
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dominated many precinct, district, county, and state organizations. In an
Associated Press poll of GOP County Chairman released on April 19, 35.0
percent expected Nixon to ultimately w in the nomination versus the 28.7
percent who forecast a Goldwater victory; significantly though, 45 percent
preferred the senator as their nominee compared to just 18 percent for the
former vice president.’®®
April and May were decisive months for Goldwater across the country. In
several mid-western primaries he ran virtually uncontested. The formidable
grass roots organization, "Draft Goldwater," had effectively cultivated a
majority of party leaders and consequently little campaigning was needed to
compile impressive delegate counts. For example, in Illinois, his only declared
opponent was Senator Smith, and w hile Goldwater's margin of victory was less
than anticipated, he collected 63 percent of the votes and the commitment of
most of the state's forty-eight delegates. This phenomenon was repeated
throughout much of the country. In many states, such as Texas and Nebraska
that used conventions to select national delegates, Goldwater acquired votes
faster than all other candidates combined.
The Oregon vote on May 15 threatened to temper these Goldwater
victories. As the campaign closed, opinion polls reflected Rockefeller gains at
the expense of Lodge's onetime commanding lead. Oregonians surprised most

'®®John H. Kessel, The G oldw ater C oalition: Republican Strategies in 1964. (N ew York, 1968),
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analysts by selecting Rockefeller first with 33 percent of the vote. Closing
opinion polls had still favored Lodge, who placed second w ith 27 percent,
trailed by Goldwater w ith 18 percent, Nixon w ith 17 percent. Smith with 3
percent, and Scranton w ith 2 percent. More important than the state's eighteen
delegates, the primary demonstrated Rockefeller's electability and provided his
campaign w ith sorely needed momentum and confidence going into the crucial
California race. Despite Goldwater's lackluster performance in Oregon,
Newsweek recognized his steady accumulation of delegates elsewhere in the
country. The magazine suggested that even w ithout a victory in California, the
Arizona senator might compile enough delegate support to w in the GOP
nomination on the first convention ballot. Given that only 15 percent of
Republicans nationally supported a Goldwater presidential nomination,
Newsweek described his delegate count as nothing short of "remarkable."’®®
Unlike the Oregon primary, the California ballot included only the names
o f announced candidates w ho had submitted qualifying voter petitions in
March. Not eligible for the primary. Lodge supporters temporarily backed
Rockefeller's bid for the Golden State's eighty-six delegates. Early polling data
indicated a double digit lead for the governor. Nixon and Scranton remained
neutral, but quietly hoped for a Rockefeller victory and a deadlocked July
convention. Sensing a possible end to the Goldwater crusade, both undeclared
candidates discretely courted the Arizonan and his delegates. The senator

’ “^Newsweek. M ay 18, 1964, 48.
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privately acknowledged that he preferred Scranton to any other potential
candidate.’®®
Foreign affairs resurfaced as an important campaign issue in California.
Goldwater claimed that the United States was follow ing "the most disastrous
foreign policy in its history" and that the administration was sacrificing
American soldiers in Vietnam because of "old and inadequate equipment."’®®
The New York Times referred to Goldwater's attacks on Johnson's Vietnam
policies as his "favorite issue," and the senator reiterated his promise to achieve
victory in Vietnam with an "aggressive prosecution" of the war.®°° Rockefeller
restated his charge that Goldwater's views on national defense were impulsive,
dangerous, and out of the mainstream. He scoffed at the senator's policy
statements on Vietnam and announced, "I don't believe the answer to our
foreign policy failures is found in reckless belligerence."®®’ Goldwater
promptly substantiated Rockefeller's charges w ith another incident reminiscent
of New Hampshire.
On May 24, during the ABC news program "Issues and Answers,"
Goldwater was asked about U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Recounting a recent
meeting held between the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Joint

' ““G oldw ater and Casserly, Goldw ater. 213.
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Chiefs of Staff, Goldwater stated that the use of low-yield nuclear weapons was
considered as an option to defoliating the dense jungles that concealed
Vietnamese supply routes. After the interview, the Associated Press and the
United Press International reported that Goldwater advocated the use of
nuclear weapons in Vietnam. The New York Times commented that the more
Goldwater was criticized for m ilitant foreign policy statements the more he
made them. The senator attempted to clarify his position, "I w ould use
conventional weapons. I would not use atomic weapons when conventional
weapons w ill do the job."®®® Later the AP issued a correction and the UPl
retracted the story, but the m ilitant Goldwater image had been reinforced. The
senator's next setback did not result from a misinterpretation or a
"Goldwaterism."
On May 25, the New York Herald Tribune published a front page letter
written by former President Eisenhower describing the ideal Republican
presidential candidate. The paper ran a parallel article interpreting the letter as
an attack on the Arizona senator. Eisenhower, pressured by anti-Goldwater
forces, called for a "responsible, forward looking candidate" w ho rejected
simple solutions and "impulsiveness" in foreign affairs.®®® Goldwater
recognized the article as a timely, disguised assault but countered that he fit
Ike's description as well as Rockefeller. The senator attempted to minimize the

®°®Los Angeles Times. M ay 27, 1964.
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untimely damage and in jest sent photographs to Eisenhower and the press of
himself posing w ith an arrow under his arm, appearing to have been shot in
the back.®®"
The Arizonan's recent difficulties were reflected in new polling data. A
Harris poll reported a 51 to 41 percent advantage for Rockefeller over
Goldwater in California due largely to foreign policy issues. Although
Goldwater had begun to attract a majority of previously undecided voters, the
pollster doubted the senator's ability to w in the primary."®®® In a last-ditch
effort to capitalize on the Goldwater image, the Rockefeller camp mailed more
than one m illion pamphlets to Republican households. The headline on the
mailing read, "W ho Do You Want in the Room w ith the H Bomb?."®®®
Rockefeller told reporters that Californians had a choice between either
"constructive, forward looking, responsibility or narrow, doctrinaire,
extremism."®®® The Goldwater camp launched a massive counterattack
including a last-minute advertising blitz coordinated w ith the mass deployment
of loyal foot soldiers who enthusiastically knocked on voters' doors.
Goldwater's fortunes turned noticeably on May 30 when Mrs. Rockefeller
gave birth to a baby girl. The ensuing publicity served to rekindle the public's

®®"Goldwater and Casserly, G oldw ater. 214.
®°®Los Angeles Times. M ay 29, 1964.
®°®Goldwater and Casserly, G oldw ater. 216.
®°®N ew York Times. June 2, 1964.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102
negative attitudes surrounding the couple's recent divorces and remarriage. On
the next day, just prior to the election, former President Eisenhower told
reporters that his recent newspaper article had not purposely been antiGoldwater, and any such inferences were "complete misinterpretations."®®®
This last minute flurry of events greatly benefitted Goldwater, and late
preelection polls indicated that voting would be extremely close. On June 2,
Californians granted Goldwater a narrow but important 51 to 49 percent
victory. The election's momentum carried over to additional victories in
Washington, Colorado, Minnesota, Virginia, Texas and Alabama. This series of
triumphs seemed to assure the maverick the Republican nomination.
Shortly after his climactic victory in California, Goldwater traveled to
Washington to cast his vote on the controversial 1964 Civil Rights Act. The
legislation had been debated in the Senate for several months, but Goldwater
and other senators considered certain provisions of the law to be
unconstitutional and recommended further amendment. He stated that the bill
had been rashly passed because of political pressures and claimed that "if they
could have locked the doors to the Senate and turned off the lights, you
w ouldn't have gotten 25 votes [in favor of the Act]."®®® Goldwater had been
a civil rights advocate for nearly twenty years. He had helped desegregate
Arizona's A ir National Guard and Phoenix's lunch counters. He supported the

®®®McDowell, Campaign Fever. 67.
®®®lbid., 93.
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National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and had voted for
the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960. But his criticism of certain components
of the 1964 legislation allowed opponents to label him a racist and
segregationist. Political adversaries contended that Goldwater was pandering to
white Southern voters and to a "backlash" vote in the North, a charge he
categorically denied. Even New York Times columnist James Reston, hardly a
Goldwater supporter, characterized the senator's defense of his position as
"courageous."®’®
Disturbed over Goldwater's posturing on civil rights and by his surprising
California victory, former President Eisenhower arranged a private meeting with
Governor Scranton in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, to discuss mutual concerns for
the party's leadership. Scranton left the meeting under the false impression that
Ike would endorse him as a late challenger to Goldwater. Eisenhower
subsequently announced that he would not support a stop-Goldwater
movement. On June 6 at the Annual Conference of Governors in Cleveland,
Michigan governor Romney gave a rare Sunday press conference and attacked
Goldwater as an extremist. The senator responded by complaining that his
opponents seemed "more intent on wrecking the party then on helping to win
some elections."®” Six days later, w ithout Eisenhower's public support,
Scranton announced his belated candidacy for the Republican nomination. The

®'®Goldwater and Casserly, G oldwater. 173.
®” Novak, The Aeonv. 435.
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Pennsylvania governor wasted no time perpetuating the Goldwater image.
Scranton proclaimed that he offered the GOP a "real choice" and that he
rejected the "echo of fear and of reaction - - the echo from the never-never
land that puts our nation on the road backward to a lesser place in the world
of free men."®’® Scranton received the support of a somewhat deflated
Rockefeller organization, and Henry Cabot Lodge resigned his ambassadorship
to South Vietnam and returned stateside to roundout the GOP's anti-Goldwater
coalition.
Scranton campaigned vigorously in twelve states during June and soon
replaced Lodge and Rockefeller atop national opinion polls, but it was too late.
National delegate support for Goldwater was deep and unwavering. W ith a
clear majority of votes intact for a first ballot nomination, Goldwater hoped the
Republican convention w ould be a celebration of the conservative wing's
victory and serve as a launching pad for the party's reclamation of the White
House. The 1964 convention was anything but a celebration of the
conservative movement. Instead, the convention, later referred to as a "bloody
Republican civil war," displayed the dramatic division between the party's
conservative and liberal factions.®’ ®
Five days before the opening of the San Francisco convention, Scranton
was still searching for a divisive incident to derail the Goldwater nomination.

®'®McDowell, Campaign Fever. 70.
®’®Goldwater and Casserly, G oldw ater. 220.
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The governor appeared on the NBC morning show "Today" calling the
Arizonan "impulsive" and he characterized a recent Goldwater interview in Per
Soieeel as "reckless and dangerous."®’" The June 30 interview w ith the
German news magazine became one of several controversies at the Cow
Palace, and reporter Charles M cDowell went so far as to called it "the central
issue and basic document of the convention."®’®The press repeatedly called
on Goldwater to defend his comments in the interview. The article covered a
broad range of subjects but emphasized foreign policy issues such as foreign
aid, involvement in Vietnam, and relations with Germany. A translation of the
interview as printed by U.S. News & W orld Report revealed classic
Goldwaterisms, many of which are worth recounting to demonstrate his
ongoing willingness to engage in the type of controversial conversation that
had plagued his campaign.®’® Responding to a question about his "shoot
from the hip" style, Goldwater said, "I'll have to admit that I possibly do shoot
from the hip...I'm not the most intelligent man...and a lot of people think I'm
quite ignorant...[but] I've experienced more things probably than most men of
this Congress...and I don't have to stop and think in detail about them." He
expressed his concern about the Soviet Union's increasing military parity, but
stated that "the United States is strong enough m ilitarily to do pretty much

®’" N ew York Times. July 10, 1964.
®’®McDowell, Campaign Fever. 89.
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what she wants to do with Russia." The senator acknowledged that he was
w illin g to take the country to the brink of war against communism, given the
successful precedents of the Straits of Formosa, of Lebanon, of Egypt, of
Greece, and of Berlin. When questioned about the U.S. commitment to
Vietnam he responded, "I think President Johnson is tending in that direction - that we aren't going to pull out of Southeast Asia, but that we are going to win,
in fact. Now the next decision becomes based on m ilitary decisions. I don't
think that's up to a Presidential candidate, or even the President. I would turn
to my Joints Chiefs o f Staff and say: 'Fellows, we made a decision to win; now
it's your problem'."®’ ®
The interview also indicated that Goldwater favored strengthening the
United State's military alliances, and when asked about Germany's
participation, he said "An alliance with Germany is, I think, imperative....had
not Germany in both wars been subjected to the supreme command of m en-or
a man in any case - - who d id n 't understand war, I think Germany w ould have
won both of them." Regarding foreign aid, Goldwater acknowledged the
benefits of the Marshall Plan - - "there was some wisdom to it" - - but he
remained opposed to further economic aid, saying "I don't want to give it.
Period." Instead, Goldwater proposed a multinational fund for extending credit
to needy nations. He contended that "this business of the United States just
w illy-n illy giving billions of dollars away and receiving nothing in return - - 1
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can't buy that. We can't afford it."®’®
The m ilitant nature of Goldwater's responses in the Per Soieeel article
deepened the schism w ithin the Republican Party. The interview had also
indicated his doubt that he could w in the presidential election. When asked if
he could beat Johnson, Goldwater said "as of now - - no...l don't think any
Republican can - - as of now. But I don't think Johnson is better equipped than
I would be. Nor do I think I am the best man in the Republican party or...in
the United States. I...decided to give the people...a chance to express
themselves. Look the idea of becoming a United States Senator scares the hell
out of me. Becoming President is even more so."®’®
Obviously the probability of Goldwater's presidential nomination also
frightened his Republican opponents. Upon his arrival at the San Francisco
convention, former Ambassador Lodge noted that his primary task there was to
"picture Mr. Goldwater...as an imprudent and trigger happy candidate who
would rather drop bombs rather than carry out a cautious foreign policy."®®®
Goldwater was bitter over the continued attacks and did little to calm the
emotions of adversaries at the convention. On July 12, the last day before the
convention, the Arizonan received a damning letter from desperate Scranton
supporters. The letter was a condemnation of the senator, branding him an

®’ ®lbid.
®’®lbid.
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"irresponsible radical" and describing his ardent delegate supporters as "little
more than a flock of chickens whose necks w ill be wrung at will."®®’ The
letter concluded w ith a call for an open debate at the convention between the
two candidates. Charles M cDowell described this communication as "perhaps
the most remarkable episode in the strange, ill-starred odyssey of W illiam W.
Scranton."®®® For Goldwater the incident ended any possibility of a Scranton
vice presidential nomination, and he sent copies of the letter to all convention
delegates and to the press. He attached a copy of an anecdote written by
Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greely. The passage read:
Dear Sir: I have just read yours of the 19th addressed to myself through the New York Tribune.
If there be in it any statement or assumptions of fact, which I may know to be erroneous, I do
not, now and here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be
falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an
impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it deference to an old friend, whose heart I have always
supposed to be right."^"

M cDowell noted the irony that just before Goldwater's nomination, "the
moderates were practicing extremism and the extremists [were] quoting Lincoln
on forgiveness and restraint."®®"
W ith the Scranton letter disarmed, convention activities proceeded with
routine business. Goldwater supporters ensured that the Republican platform
met w ith the senator's approval by rejecting attempts to alter three crucial

®®’ Los Angeles Times, ju ly 13, 1964.
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sections. First, to alleviate fears that the GOP was being taken over by right
w ing radicals. Rockefeller called for the denunciation of radical groups
including the John Birch Society and the Klu Klux Klan. The draft platform
already read "we are against all extreme groups of left and the right who are
violent."®®® The 1964 Democratic Platform would contain specific
denunciations, but Goldwater and even Eisenhower were against naming
specific groups. Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania introduced a second
Scranton-inspired amendment emphasizing Republican support for the Civil
Rights Act. The Goldwater camp was satisfied w ith the first draft, which read
"we pledge full implementation and faithful execution of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and all other civil rights statutes, to assure equal rights and opportunities
guaranteed by the Constitution to every citizen." The third major amendment
called for specific language stating the party's belief that onlv the President had
control of the country's nuclear arsenal. This amendment was the most
unacceptable to the conservatives, given Goldwater's position that NATO's
Supreme Commander should have the authority to repel a Soviet invasion with
nuclear weapons. Under the heading "NATO: The Great Shield" the platform
draft read, "Republican leadership w ill move immediately...to explore and
recommend effective new ways to strengthen alliance participation and
fulfillment."®®®

®®®Kirk H. Porter and D onald Bruce johnson. National Partv Platforms. 1840-1968 (Chicago,
1972), 683.
®®®lbid., 683, 688.
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Goldwater kept foreign affairs at the forefront of the convention by giving
foreign policy addresses at Youth for Goldwater rallies on July 13 and July 14.
He chose not to mention the Johnson administration specifically but instead
attacked the "weakness and cowardice" of the "New Frontier." He proclaimed
that "my opponents w ill call me a warmonger. But I'm the best peacemonger
among all the candidates. The surest way to disaster is the road we're
following. The surest way to preserve the peace is through strength - - political,
moral, economic and military."®®® The senator's speeches did little to
promote GOP unity.
On the night of July 14, the Republican Party dramatically displayed its
continuing dissension on national television. The Goldwater staff had arranged
for the proposed platform amendments to be presented to delegates late at
night to prevent a large television viewership, and by the time Rockefeller took
the podium it was almost midnight eastern time. When he called for changes
to the civil rights portion of the platform, he was booed and jeered by the
crowd in the gallery. The Goldwaterites had cornered their villain, the eastern
liberal, the enemy of conservatism, and they attacked him "viciously." Even
Goldwater was dismayed by the spectacle. Others presenting amendment
proposals were treated w ith "grudging tolerance."®®® When the ballots were
cast for changes to the platform, all amendments were rejected by a large

®®®Los Angeles Times, ju ly 15, 1964.
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majority of delegates.
On the follow ing day "in a scene that resembled the lynching of
liberalism," Barry Morris Goldwater was nominated as the Republican
presidential candidate on the first ballot.®®® He needed 655 votes and
received 883. Two days later Goldwater chose New York congressman and
Republican National Chairman W illiam E. M iller as his vice presidential
nominee. M iller, a former assistant prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crime
trials in Germany, was a Catholic from New York, and Goldwater believed that
the loyal conservative brought geographic and religious diversity to the ticket.
W hile preparing his nomination acceptance speech, Goldwater was
informed that President Johnson was leading in early public opinion polls 80 to
20 percent. He told his staff that "we should be putting together a rejection
speech and tell them all to go to hell." Recognizing Goldwater's opportunity to
articulate his positions, the speech writers rejected rapprochement w ith fellow
Republicans despite a conciliatory concession address by Governor Scranton.
According to Goldwater his address signaled "a historic break from the party's
liberal past."®®® The uncompromising speech accused the Democratic
leadership of weak and deceitful foreign policies that let "our finest men die on
battlefields unmarked by purpose, pride, or the prospect of victory."®®’ He

®®®Eric F. G oldm an, The Traeedv O f Lvndon lohnson (New York, 1969), 168.
®®°Goldwater and Casserly, G oldw ater. 235-36.
®®’A rthur M . Schlesinger, Jr., ed.. H istory of American Presidential Elections. 1940-1968 (New
York, 1971), IV:3667. A com plete reprint o f the speech is provided.
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proclaimed that the country was at war in Vietnam but that Johnson refused to
"say whether or not the objective is victory."®®® The leader of conservatism
asserted that "extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice! And let me remind
you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!"®®® A news
correspondent covering the convention was astonished by the aggressive tone
of the address and muttered "Oh my God he is going to run [for president] as
Goldwater."®®"
Political analysts described the GOP convention as disastrous and
pondered its effect on the future of the party. Interestingly, domestic critics
agreed w ith many East European leaders in their assessments. Liberal journalists
interpreted the Goldwater nomination as a prescription for W orld War III.
Nikita Khrushchev likened the convention to a "NAZI party rally." And Polish
Communist Party chief, Wladyslaw Gomulka described Goldwater's
nomination as "unfavorable to peace" and feared that the senator's foreign
policies were directed "straight toward a global nuclear catastrophe."®®®
Goldwater's nomination was a remarkable political achievement. At no
time during the campaign did he ever lead national opinion polls as the party's
favorite candidate. His limited appeal to the majority of rank and file party

®®®Barry M . G oldw ater, W here I Stand (New York, 1964), 12-13.
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members was clearly demonstrated In the three most contested primaries. First
in New Hampshire, he was soundly defeated by an undeclared candidate
stationed more than 10,000 miles away in Southeast Asia. Two months later he
suffered a more decisive defeat in Oregon when matched against a full slate of
GOP leaders. Only in California, when the qualified ballot was limited to just
two candidates, did Goldwater muster a narrow victory.
How then did the Arizonan manage to w in the nomination? Goldwater
had acquired a devoted national follow ing of conservative voters during the
preceding ten years, a result of his non-stop public speaking tours on behalf the
of Republican Party and due to the popularity of his tw o books. The
Conscience O f A Conservative and W hv Not Victorv?. The senator provided
the GOP right wing w ith a distinct moral ideology that filled a leadership
vacuum resulting from the death of Senator Robert A. Taft and the demise of
Senator Joseph McCarthy. Even the combination of Goldwater's campaign
blunders, which appeared to substantiate charges of extremism and
warmongering and the press's periodic misrepresentation of his views could not
weaken the faith of his conservative supporters. Under the careful orchestration
of C liff W hite and the Draft Goldwater Committee, the conservatives had
successfully infiltrated and dominated many local and state party organizations,
thereby warding off the potential for serious challengers in most primary
elections and state conventions. Furthermore, the divided liberal and moderate
opposition proved unable to counter this organizational effort.
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After the California primary, w ith the GOP nomination practically assured,
Goldwater uncharacteristically failed to prepare a strategy to reconcile the
splintered party. Any Republican nominee in 1964 was a dark horse candidate
and consequently needed a cohesive party in order to mount one of the most
herculean campaign efforts since the GOP battled FDR for the W hite House.
The Arizonan mistakenly expected the same magnanimous gestures from his
opponents that he had displayed at the 1960 convention. The unprecedented
and relentless assault on Goldwater from fellow Republicans had rendered him
unable to make the necessary comprises needed to unite the party behind his
candidacy.
The means by which Barry Goldwater and his m inority wing won the
GOP nomination were impossible to replicate in a two-party national election
for the presidency. The Republicans, the minority political party, challenged a
larger, more firm ly united opposition, and Goldwater's small body of fervent
supporters could not dominate a majority of the national electorate. Before
Goldwater had begun his quest for the presidency in January 1964, the national
electorate knew and cared little about the views of Arizona's junior senator.
But once the New Hampshire campaign got underway there were daily news
reports on Goldwater and the public began to assess his policy positions and
qualifications to become their president. Over time the regular media coverage
of Goldwater's off-the-cuff statements and Governor Rockefeller's perpetuation
of the senator's image as a dangerous extremist began to resonate negatively
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w ith voters. His image was transformed from that of a maverick senator to an
extremist presidential candidate. Goldwater's views on domestic issues such as
social security and civil rights alarmed many liberal and moderate voters, but it
was the growing perception of him as a radical threatening nuclear war that
truly frightened the general electorate. As both parties looked ahead to the
presidential election. Senator Sam Nunn concisely characterized the growing
national impression of Goldwater's foreign policy views and campaign style as
"Ready! Fire! Aim!"®®®

®®®Goldwater and Casserly, G oldw ater. 238.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 6

BACK ON THE DEFENSIVE:
Lyndon Johnson, Barry Goldwater
And The Issue Of War And Peace

Separated in age by one year, Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater were
both members of the W orld War II generation. As a young man, Goldwater
began a business career w hile Johnson pursued politics after a brief stint as a
school teacher. Although they developed opposing views on the domestic role
of government, the two Westerners shared common assumptions about foreign
relations. Following the war, Johnson and Goldwater supported the militant
containment policy set forth by the Truman administration. They believed that
international communism posed a threat to U.S. security interests and that
heightened peacetime defense appropriations were a necessary deterrent to
future w orld wars. During the eight years of the Eisenhower administration.
Senators Johnson and Goldwater remained loyal Cold Warriors advocating
massive military budgets and supporting the President's foreign policy. During
the Kennedy-Johnson administration, Goldwater became a more vocal critic of
U.S. foreign policy. He attacked Kennedy on many fronts: for grossly
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overstating the relative strength of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, for the failed Bay
of Pigs invasion, and for a general lack of commitment to achieve "total
victory" over communism.^^^ The senator's disdain for Democratic leadership
in international affairs carried over to the Johnson presidency and,
consequently, became a major issue in the 1964 election.
Upon the sudden death o f President Kennedy in November 1963, Lyndon
Johnson's leadership experience proved invaluable to the nation. His modesty
and call for unity at a time of crisis comforted a shocked and grieving nation.
Stressing themes of continuity and consensus, the new President focused the
nation's agenda inward as he championed previously stalled Kennedy
legislation.^^® After less than twelve months in office, Johnson oversaw the
approval of an $11.5 billion tax cut complemented by a reduction in the
federal budget and passage of the Economic Opportunity Act which launched
the War on Poverty.^” In July 1964, the President signed into law the
historic Civil Rights Act which further protected black Americans from
discrimination in housing, employment, schools, and places o f public
accommodation. Amidst this flurry of legislative activity, Johnson confided
privately, "We've got to keep this Kennedy aura around us through this [the

^ ^ Congressional Record. July 24, 1961, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 13246.
^^®For a detailed account of LBJ's first year as President see Eric F. G oldm an, The Tragedv O f
Lvndon lohnson (N ew York. 1969), 1-256.
“ ^Despite vigorous opposition from Republican senator Karl M undt, Johnson also oversaw
legislation a llo w in g the sale o f surplus wheat to Russia and other com m unist countries. See Lyndon
B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency. 1963-1969 (N ew York, 1971), 39.
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1964 presidential] e l e c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to Johnson aide Eric F. Goldman,
the Texan had dreamed about living in the W hite House and "now was the
chance...to w in the presidency.
Lyndon Baines Johnson was born in 1908 in rural central Texas, the son of
Sam E. Johnson, Jr., a sometime barber, teacher, justice o f the peace and
populist legislator. "Sam Johnson's boy" was bright and energetic. Following
high school, young Johnson attended South West Texas Teachers College in
San Marcos, and upon graduation taught public school in rural Texas before
moving to a Houston high school in 1930. In 1931 he actively campaigned for
Texas congressman Richard Kleberg, who subsequently hired Johnson as his
full-time congressional secretary. Johnson immersed himself in the political
process, emerged as a marginal Washington player and even came to dominate
Kleberg. In 1935 he left Washington to become the Texas Director of the
National Youth Administration. Less than two years later, Johnson resigned
from the NYA to run for Congress. He campaigned as an earnest New Deal
liberal, won the election and embarked on a brilliant political career.
During his first seven years in Congress, Johnson aligned himself with
Roosevelt's domestic and international initiatives. His votes for a peacetime
draft, for pro-British and French amendments to neutrality legislation, and for
creation of Lend-Lease, all demonstrated his loyalty to the President's foreign

^■’“Eric Foner and John Garraty, ed.. The Reader's Com panion to Am erican H istorv (Boston,
1991), 600.
^'’ ’G oldm an, Tragedv O f Lvndon lohnson. 171.
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policy agenda. Biographer Robert Dallek noted that the Texan had advocated
increased defense spending from "the moment he set foot in the House in
1937."^'*^ Government's heightened spending during the early 1940s enabled
Johnson to funnel sorely needed capital into the Texas economy, and he took
an active role in the development of m ilitary installations across the state.
During W orld War II, Johnson worked for the Navy Department managing war
materials production in Texas and on the west coast.^'*®
Sensing the nation's general postwar conservatism, Johnson accentuated
his states' rights perspective on labor issues, civil rights, and pro-oil industry
legislation and won reelection to the House in both 1944 and 1946. As the
Cold War developed, he became increasingly attentive to foreign policy and
fervently supported the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. In 1948 he ran for the U.S. Senate by extolling
the virtues of his ten years of public service and by characterizing his opponent
as a unionist and isolationist. Campaigning against the backdrop o f the Berlin
crisis, Johnson found speeches against communism "an irresistible tactic." His
Cold War hyperbole energized crowds, as he promoted increased military
preparedness as a deterrent to communist aggression which, he warned.

Robert Dallek. Lone Star Rising: Lvndon lohnson and His Times. 1908-1960 (N ew York. 1991),
9.
^“'^Eager to establish any semblance o f a com bat record, Johnson managed to arrange tw o trips
abroad. A trip to the Pacific Theater earned him a Silver Star w hich, according to his biographer
D allek, was "the least deserved and most displayed medal" of the war. A second excursion to Europe
late in the w ar impressed upon Johnson the region's vu ln e ra b ility to subversive com m unist
movements.
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"surges forward in a blood-red tide." W ith both candidates committing voting
fraud, Johnson won election to the Senate by a mere eighty-seven votes,
thereby earning the nickname "Landslide Lyndon.
As a freshmen senator, Johnson supported President Truman's Fair Deal
programs, save civil rights and pro-labor amendments to the Taft-Hartley law.
His political ambitions led to pragmatic relationships w ith Democratic
conservatives like Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia and liberals such as
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota. As a member of the Senate Armed
Services and Foreign Commerce committees, Johnson continued to support
Truman's Cold War policies including the comprehensive m ilitary build-up
outlined in National Security Council Memorandum No. 68.^'"®
Senate Democrats suffered key reelection losses in 1950. Arizonan Ernest
W. McFarland was elevated to Senate Democratic leader and Johnson,
perceived as a hard w orking centrist, was made the youngest w hip in party
history. McFarland's subsequent election loss to GOP upstart Barry Goldwater
in 1952 enabled Johnson to advance to Democratic majority leader. As Senate
leader he implemented a strategy for the Democrats' return to the majority; it
emphasized strong party unity and bipartisan foreign policy, w hich the Texan
called the "politics o f responsibility."^''® In his 1954 reelection bid, "Landslide

^“'‘'D allek, Lone Star Rising. 299, 323, 343.
""®lbid., 396-97.
^"®lbid., 441.
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Lyndon" earned a true landslide victory, w inning 71 percent of the vote while
the Democrats simultaneously regained their majority in the Senate.
M ajority Leader Johnson's shrewd management of Senate rules, committee
appointments, legislative scheduling, and other responsibilities (which
frequently ignored the tradition of seniority) helped consolidate his power and
improve his effectiveness as party leader. Johnson oversaw the passage of
voluminous legislation effecting trade, social security, wages and housing. His
legislative accomplishments resulted in part from the infamous "Johnson
treatment," w hich historian Robert A. Divine defined as a "judicious mixture of
enticement and fear."^"^ By 1956 Johnson was considered a leading
presidential candidate, and Joseph P. Kennedy even offered to sponsor a
Johnson-John F. Kennedy ticket. The Texan declined the offer and refused to
campaign overtly for the nomination. Although Illinois governor Adlai
Stevenson eventually won the Democratic nomination, Johnson sensed that the
White House was w ithin his grasp and began to position himself for a possible
presidential run in 1960. In Congress he sought to accommodate liberal
Democrats by slowly reversing his states' rights position on civil rights and
attempted to appear more independent of President Eisenhower's foreign
policies. Still an ardent Cold Warrior, much of Johnson's partisan maneuvering
on foreign affairs, such as rebuking Ike's criticism of Israel during the Suez

^■’^Robert A. D ivine, Since 1945: Politics and D iplom acv in Recent Am erican H istorv (New York,
1979), 142.
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crisis, remained largely symbolic. In the summer of 1960, LBJ supported the
Republican President during the collapse o f the U.S.-Soviet Paris summit. He
shrewdly manipulated the circumstances to criticize rival presidential aspirant
John Kennedy, who had blasted Eisenhower for the failed conference.
The Democrats were not lacking presidential candidates in 1960. Johnson
again decided not to organize an overt campaign, preferring instead to be
drafted. A draft never materialized. Kennedy's candidacy benefitted from solid
organization and strong financial backing and he scored primary victories in
New Hampshire, Wisconsin and West Virginia.^"® Against the advice of
friends, Johnson embarked on a belated run for the nomination, hoping for a
deadlocked convention. Instead, the youthful Massachusetts senator won on the
first ballot. Surprisingly, Kennedy asked Johnson to become the vice
presidential nominee. LBJ, who had often referred to JFK as a "lightweight," a
"playboy" or simply as "the boy," accepted the offer believing "power is were
power goes."^'*® After serving twenty-three years in Congress, Lyndon Johnson
left the federal legislature as "the most powerful M ajority Leader in Senate
history."^®®
Johnson hoped to elevate the vice presidency. He quickly solicited

^‘’®Theodore H. W hite , The M aking O f The President 1960 (New York, 1961), 78-114.
^'•^Dallek, Lone Star Rising. 579. Shortly after Johnson accepted the nom ination, a shocked fe llo w
senator, Barry Goldw ater, w rote to him ; it is d iffic u lt "to understand how you are going to try to
embrace the socialist platform o f your party...You were intended fo r great things, but I d o n 't think
you are going to achieve them now ." See Vantage Point. 102.
^®®Dallek, Lone Star Rising. 590.
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unprecedented responsibility and authority and even suggested that he occupy
an office adjoining the President's. Kennedy deftly rejected the aggressive
overtures. Although the President routinely consulted w ith Johnson on major
issues, the Vice President was never fully accepted into Kennedy's inner circle
of advisors. This was apparent by his absence from cabinet meeting discussions
on important domestic issues such as the 1962 steel crisis and the integration
of James Meredith into the University of Mississippi. Johnson was also missing
from key foreign affairs meetings including those surrounding the Bay of Pigs
invasion and many of the Executive Committee gatherings during the Cuban
missile crisis.
Johnson became increasingly frustrated by his limited responsibilities and
bristled at the administrations's inability to pass major legislation. The former
senate majority leader "retreated into a shell."” ' Nevertheless, Kennedy
possessed sincere respect and affection for Johnson and sought to involve him
in "meaningful activity" w ith appointments as chairman of the administration's
Space Council and the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.
Furthermore, the President limited his own travel abroad and dispatched
Johnson on more than tw o dozen diplomatic missions, including an important
August 1961 trip to West Berlin designed to demonstrate U.S. commitment to
Germany during construction of the Berlin W all. The Vice President enjoyed
his international assignments as they made him the center of press attention
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and provided at least temporary freedom from the Kennedy W hite House.
Johnson's most publicized mission abroad was to South Vietnam. In late
April 1961 Kennedy began to receive recommendations to deploy U.S. combat
troops to South Vietnam from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and from an inter
departmental task force studying Vietnam.” ^ In May, Kennedy sent the Vice
President on an extended tour of Southeast Asia which included a lengthy
layover in Saigon. Johnson publicly lauded President Ngo Dinh Diem and
upon his return to Washington advised the President not to give up on the
South Vietnamese leader. He reminded reporters that, "he's the only boy we
got out there," but privately warned Kennedy that Diem was "beset by many
problems...[and] is remote from the people."” ®Johnson, like most
presidential advisors, later rejected all propositions that the United States
abandon South Vietnam and, instead, he encouraged Kennedy to take stronger
military action. He counseled that "The battle against Communism must be
joined in Southeast Asia w ith strength and determination to achieve success
there."” '* Despite his travels abroad and domestic appointments, Johnson was
considered "underemployed" in the vice presidency and his three-year tenure
was "the lowest point" of his remarkable political career.®®® Still, just prior to

” ®Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedv (N ew York, 1965), 652.
®®®David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York, 1992), 134.
” ‘*Giglio. lohn F. Kennedv. 135.
” ®Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest. 133.
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Kennedy's assassination, the Texan, who undoubtedly was planning four years
ahead, had accepted the President's offer to remain on the Democratic ticket
for the upcoming presidential election.
After Kennedy's death, Lyndon Johnson's 1964 presidential nomination
was never in serious jeopardy, although Alabama's Democratic governor
George C. Wallace entered several primary elections. Promoting himself as a
conservative alternative, the governor attracted a surprisingly large
following.®®® The Wallace candidacy appealed to a "white back-lash" among
racial segregationists, and he received 30 percent of the vote in Indiana, 34
percent in Wisconsin and an astonishing 43 percent in Maryland.®®® Despite
these respectable showings, the governor ended his campaign in July under the
shadow of an allegedly more viable conservative candidate, Barry Goldwater,
w ho had been nominated at the GOP San Francisco convention. It was
Johnson's clandestine selection of a running mate and the politically dangerous
insurgence of an all black Mississippi delegation at the Democratic National
Convention that provided the most compelling drama for the Democrats in
1964.
President Johnson had enjoyed such high popularity ratings during his first
year in office that the selection of a running-mate appeared almost insignificant.
But in typical Johnsonian fashion he engaged in a "name dropping game" and

®®®Stephen Lesher, George W allace: American Populist (N ew York, 1994), 267-310.
®®®Theodore H. W h ite, The M aking O f The President 1964 (New York, 1969), 233-34.
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manipulated various potential nominees.®®® As a test of his abilities, the
President called upon Senate Majority W hip Hubert H. Humphrey to resolve
the only crisis of the Atlantic City Democratic Convention.
Attempts to register black voters into the lily-w hite Mississippi Democratic
Party had failed miserably prior to the convention as blacks had been barred
from county and state conventions. As a result, blacks formed a new party, the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.®®® Forty-four MFDP delegates went to
Atlantic City to contest the seats of Mississippi's all-white delegation. Fearing
the disruption of a nasty floor fight before a national television audience,
Johnson demanded that a compromise be arranged. Humphrey, aided by
Minnesota attorney general Walter Mondale and labor leader W alter Reuther,
proposed a three pronged solution: that two MFDP delegates be allowed to
vote at large, that the white Mississippi delegation pledge allegiance to the
Johnson ticket, and that no delegates from states which discriminated against
blacks be allowed to participate in future conventions. The compromise was
clearly biased toward conservative southern delegates, whom Johnson feared
would bolt the party and support Goldwater. Texas governor John Connally
had warned the President, "If you seat those black buggers the w hole South
w ill walk out."®®® Mississippi's black delegation firm ly rejected the token

®®®Hubert H. H um phrev The Education O f A Public Man: M v Life and Politics (N ew York. 1976),
297.
®®®Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle fo r Black Eaualitv 1954-1980 (N ew York, 1981), 179.
®®®lbid., 182.
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proposition and stormed out of the convention. Most convention delegates
supported the Humphrey compromise because a more liberal proposal could
have factionalized the party and jeopardized the election. The crisis subsided
when the vice presidential nomination and platform approval took precedence.
As early as May 1964, Johnson had confided in Humphrey that he was
the preferred vice presidential candidate but cautioned that it might not be
politically feasible. A former mayor of Minneapolis, Humphrey was a liberal
Democrat who had supported Truman's divisive pro-civil rights platform in
1948. A staunch supporter of labor, farm subsidies, price supports and civil
rights, the Minnesotan, like most of his contemporaries, was also a Cold
Warrior. Johnson eventually offered the nomination and Humphrey, with
widespread support from convention delegates, readily accepted. He had
lobbied actively for the vice presidency and promised unswerving loyalty to
Johnson despite the President's "aggravating" and "bizarre" method of selecting
a running mate.®®'
The Johnson-Humphrey ticket ran on a platform that touted four years of
accomplishments under Kennedy and Johnson. On the domestic front it
boasted progress in civil rights, the passage of tax cuts, and inroads against
poverty. The platform's strong emphasis on foreign affairs was indicative of
Johnson's intention to capitalize on the war and peace issue in the campaign.

®®'Humphrey, Education O f A P ublic M an. 299. H um phrey w rote "Johnson had drained every
b it of ju ice out o f the nom ination, and he had drained a good deal out of me."
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The Democrats sought to disarm Goldwater's charges that the Democrats were
"soft" on communism by emphasizing recent international successes. Kennedy's
resolution of the Cuban missile crisis and Johnson's firm response to the Gulf
of Tonkin incidents were cited as examples of the Democrats' determination to
challenge the communist threat. The Democrats claimed that, "On the
battlefield of the Cold War one engagement after another has been fought and
won."®®® The platform also alluded to the potential consequences of
perceived Goldwater's recklessness: "One rash act, one thoughtless decision,
one unchecked reaction - - and cities could become smouldering ruins and
farms parched wasteland. The leadership we offer has already been tested in
the crucible of crisis and challenge." Building upon the theme of responsible
leadership, the Democrats proclaimed the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as the
first meaningful step toward controlling the ominous arms race, and as an
additional jab at Goldwater, the platform clarified that "Control of the use of
nuclear weapons must remain solely with...the President of the United
States."®®®
Democratic emphasis on the G ulf of Tonkin affair was also meant to
accentuate the differences between Johnson and Goldwater. Between the GOP
and Democratic Conventions, on August 2, 1964, three small North
Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the American destroyer Maddox thirty miles

®®®Kirk H. Porter and D onald Bruce Johnson, ed.. National Partv Platforms. 1840-1968 (Chicago,
1970), 654.
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off the North Vietnamese coast in the G ulf of Tonkin. Although the assault
appeared entirely unprovoked, the United States had been systematically aiding
South Vietnamese commando raids on the North. The Maddox, which had
been on a routine intelligence gathering patrol, easily repelled the attack with
the assistance of fighter jets launched from the USS Ticonderoea. President
Johnson responded to the situation by ordering a second destroyer to the gulf.
On August 4 during a severe storm, both U.S. destroyers claimed to have come
under renewed attack. Despite mounting evidence that a second attack never
actually occurred, the President delivered a national television address to
announce his order for limited retaliation bombing against North Vietnam.
According to historian George C. Herring, the administration had been "in a
mood to retaliate" as Johnson and his advisors feared being perceived as "paper
tigers" reluctant to risk an escalation of the war.®®'' A Johnson aide later
referred to the President's management of the Tonkin crisis as "ideal
campaigning."®®®
Barry Goldwater supported the President's "firm action" in response to the
Tonkin crisis, but claimed that the North Vietnamese attack had resulted from
Johnson's unclear policy objectives. The senator demanded a "new policy" that

®®*George C. Herring. Am erica's Longest W ar: The United States And Vietnam . 1950-1975 (New
York, 1986), 120-21.
®®®Goldman, The Tragedv O f Lvndon lohnson. 176. George C. H erring criticize d Johnson for
rallyin g national support w ith o u t disclosing the U nited State's substantive covert activity against the
North Vietnamese. See Am erica's Longest W ar. 122.
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was committed to winning the war in Vietnam.®®® Goldwater's critics used
the crisis to emphasize the potentially dangerous ramifications of his
presidency. They charged that the Arizonan would have over reacted to such
an incident and instead of ordering 63 sorties against North Vietnam he would
have commanded 630. The New Reoublic commented that Goldwater prefers
"saturating whole cities and regions w ith old-fashioned nuclear bombs."®®®
Actually, the senator supported the level of Johnson's retaliation, saying "we
cannot allow the American flag to be shot at."®®® However, on August 8, he
still intended to exploit events in Vietnam and proclaimed that the Democratic
leadership had failed to "understand communism" and accused it of pursuing
peace "at any price."®®® On the same day. Congress overwhelm ingly passed
the G ulf of Tonkin Resolution granting the President broad m ilitary authority to
intervene in Vietnam. Democrat J. W illiam Fulbright, w ho had recently become
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, skillfully shepherded the
measure's passage. The G ulf of Tonkin crisis enabled Johnson to rally the
country behind his leadership and to weaken charges that he lacked adequate
experience to conduct foreign policy or that he would tolerate communist

®®®Goldwater Campaign Speech, W ashington D.C., August 10,196 4, B arrvG oldw ater Campaign
Speeches V olum e I. p.6, Barry M . G oldw ater C ollection, A rizona H istorical Foundation, Tempe,
Arizona; hereafter cited as G oldw ater C ollection.
^®^N ew Republic. August 22, 1964, 4.
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^®^N ew York Times. August 7, 1964.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

131

incursions. Historian Stephen E. Ambrose referred to passage of the Tonkin
resolution as "the decisive moment in the 1964 election," concluding that the
President had "pulled off a political miracle,"®®®
Prior to the start o f his official campaigning, Goldwater urged more
aggressive prosecution of the war in Vietnam "with the object of ending
it."®®' He proclaimed that Vietnam symbolized not a minor skirmish but
instead a major battlefield in the free-world's struggle against communism. The
nation, he claimed, needed to "back up its resolve w ith whatever manpower,
equipment, and weaponry it may take...to stem the Communist advance in
Laos and Vietnam."®®® The senator characterized Johnson's cautious Vietnam
policy as shameful and contended that the country could not "afford the
tragedy of sending our boys into a war we w ill not permit them to win.
Nowhere in the w orld today is there a clearer road to peace through strength
than in Vietnam."®®®
In August, national election polls favored Johnson by 65 to 30 percent, but
his opponent demonstrated strength in the South where he led the President 50
to 41 percent. The Christian Science M onitor reported that Goldwater led in

®®°Stephen E. Ambrose, N ixon: The T rium ph of a P olitician. 1962-1972 vol. 2, (N ew York, 1989),
47-58.
®®'Goldwater C ollection, W ashington D.C., August 10, 1964, Barrv G oldw ater Campaign
Speeches V olum e I. p.6.
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®®®lbid., 28-29.
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nine states in addition to those in the South.®®'* Despite Johnson's
overwhelming national margin, many political analysts foresaw "a hot contest"
because of the candidates' stark contrasting positions and the Arizonan's
proven ability to w in election upsets.®®®
Vacationing in northern California during early August, Goldwater began
to prepare for a campaign strategy meeting with GOP leaders. Goldwater,
W illiam E. M iller, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Richard M. Nixon led the one
day "unity conference" on August 12 in Hershey, Pennsylvania, which was
attended by more than thirty Republican congressmen, senators, governors and
gubernatorial candidates. The conference provided Goldwater a forum to clarify
his position on controversial campaign issues and to ease concerns of fellow
Republican leaders. The objective was clear; unify the splintered party.
Eisenhower and Nixon knew that w ithout at least a semblance of party
cohesion, victory in November was impossible. Eisenhower opened the
proceedings by urging the Republicans to "get our souls bared so that when we
go out we can put something together that is worthwhile, that can w in." Vice
presidential nominee M iller gave a brief opening address. He called for
cooperation between local, state and national Republican organizations and
outlined the 1964 election strategy as the reaffirmation o f the party's
commitment to "firmness and strength in foreign affairs and to fiscal

^®'*Newsweek. August 17, 1964, 34, Time. August 7, 1964, 20-21.
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responsibility at home."®®®
In the conference's principal speech, Goldwater confronted the
controversial issues of his candidacy: social security, civil rights, and foreign
policy extremism. The Arizonan claimed that his position was misunderstood
on all of these points. Both Eisenhower and Nixon had approved Goldwater's
text in advance, and Ike told the conferees, "I respect it and admire it."®®®
The senator underscored his basic support for the social security program,
promised strict adherence to all civil rights legislation, and repudiated all
extremist groups that relied on threats or violence. But most of all, he sought to
correct what he called "the supreme political lie" that a Goldwater presidency
would somehow lead to nuclear war. The senator promised that his election to
the W hite House would signal "an immediate return to the proven policy of
peace through strength w hich was the hallmark of the Eisenhower years."®®®
And, as President he w ould engage in routine and in-depth consultation with
Eisenhower and Nixon on international affairs and related cabinet
appointments. Goldwater also reaffirmed his commitment to the NATO alliance
and the United Nations, declaring them valuable w orld peace organizations.
The speech was greeted w ith vigorous applause.

®®®Karl Hess, In A Cause That W ill Trium ph: The G oldw ater Campaign and the Future of
Conservatism. (N ew York, 1967), 169, 173. A transcript of the conference is reprinted as an
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During an extensive question and answer period follow ing the senator's
address, several governors including George W. Romney and Nelson A.
Rockefeller warned of the explosiveness of the civil rights issue in major urban
areas and of the nominee's lingering image as a warmonger. Goldwater
acknowledged the danger of racism as a campaign issue, even saying, "I am
scared to death of it....I w ill lean overbackwards to keep from discussing it."
Eisenhower instructed the senator to refute his negative image as a militant on
a daily basis during the campaign, and Governor W illiam Scranton suggested
using extensive television advertising to promote the nominee's actual
positions. Arizona governor Paul Fannin instructed the GOP leaders to work
hard to place Goldwater's "proper image" before the public. At the end of the
conference, much to Goldwater's satisfaction, Maine governor John H. Reed
announced, "Senator, I think I want to say you have done an excellent job. You
have relieved the reservations that I had and you have my unqualified
support."®®®
Speaking at a post conference press gathering, Eisenhower emphasized his
support for the Arizonan. He told reporters that he no longer possessed any
"uncertainties...as to the fitness, adequacy and quality" of Barry Goldwater and
that he was "right on his team."®®® Even Rockefeller appeared genuinely
satisfied, admitting that the nominee's prepared statement had been "very close

®®®Hess, In A Cause That W ill Trium ph. 206, 217, 224.
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to traditional Republican principles that reflect a moderate point of view and
are in the mainstream of American thought." When some journalists insinuated
that Goldwater must have compromised his positions on important issues to
rally the GOP leadership, the senator responded that his address had not been
expedient or hypocritically conciliatory; rather it "merely, reaffirms what I've
been saying throughout the campaign."®®’ Leading news magazines covering
the Hershey meeting reached contrasting conclusions. Time commented that
Goldwater had "skillfully handled a remarkable summit conference,"®®® w hile
Newsweek claimed that his speech had been "nothing less than a series of
major concessions to the moderates."®®® Murray Kempton o f The New
Republic was equally unimpressed by the gathering, stating that "the new
Goldwater" only exhibited a change in tone and that the conference "had not
changed anything essential."®®'' Kempton also noted the absence of several
staunch Goldwater critics, including Michigan governor Romney, from the
press conference and questioned Eisenhower's new enthusiasm for the ticket.
Nonetheless, Goldwater had completed the seemingly obligatory attempt to
rally party support for the ticket, and w ith Ike, Nixon, Scranton and possibly
Rockefeller on board, the Hershey conference appeared successful.

Newsweek. August 24, 1964, 20.
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Given the soundness of the national economy and Goldwater's reluctance
to make civil rights a campaign issue, the GOP nominee saw foreign relations
as an area of vulnerability for Johnson. Reversing the senator's own "number
one problem" of war and peace however, would prove more difficult w ith the
press and the voting public than w ith party leaders.®®® M odifying his militant
image required Goldwater to curtail the jingoistic rhetoric that he had exhibited
throughout the primaries. His refusal or inability to do this had even been
evident at the Hershey press conference where the senator reaffirmed his
advocacy of U.S. interdiction of communist supply lines from North Vietnam.
His contention that Johnson had given the navy's Seventh Fleet permission to
use tactical nuclear weapons in response to the G ulf of Tonkin crisis was even
more controversial. Upon hearing the senator's comments, Johnson had broke
sharply from his strategy to ignore Goldwater and arranged an impromptu press
conference to rebuke him and deny his charges. The President said, "Loose
charges on nuclear weapons...by any candidate for any office, let alone the
Presidency, are a disservice to our national security, a great disservice to the
entire free world."®®®
Goldwater's unbridled commentary on foreign affairs continued
throughout August. Speaking at the Illinois State Fair he chastised the Johnson
administration for granting North Vietnam advance warning of the reprisal

®®®Hess. in A Cause That W ill Trium ph. 172.
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attacks in the G ulf of Tonkin affair and he repeated an earlier criticism that the
nation's defense policy was becoming too reliant upon intercontinental missiles
rather than manned bombers, Goldwater charged that under Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara, America's "deliverable nuclear capacity" would be
reduced by 90 percent in the next ten years.®®® He based this projection was
based upon the assumption that all Strategic A ir Command bombers would be
replaced by less accurate Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. He later quipped
that the A ir Force might soon need "Hertz rent-a-bombers."®®® The Defense
Department contested Goldwater's estimates and stressed that its ICBM
program was reliable and by the end of the decade w ould be able to deliver
250 percent more nuclear warheads. Campaign reporters referred to the
confusing debate as the "megatonnage gap" w ith Goldwater talking about
inaccurate missile launchers and the Pentagon stressing the cumulative
destructive power of its growing missile inventory.®®®
When asked in late August at an informal press gathering what would be
the most important issue of the campaign, Goldwater replied, foreign policy.
Earlier that week he had spoken at a veterans convention in Cleveland where

®°®Time. August 28, 1964, 18. In the same speech G oldw ater referred to the secretary as "Field
Marshall M cN am ara." In his autobiography w ith Jack Casserly, G oldw ater (N ew York, 1988), 294,
the senator called M cN am ara "one o f the most unreliable and untrustw orthy men in Am erica."
®®®Tim e. September 18, 1964, 32. W h ile discussing missile launcher inaccuracy, G oldw ater had
once com m ented that, "I w ant to lob one into the men's room of the Krem lin and make sure I hit
it." See Johnson, The Vantage Point. 102.
” ®N ew Republic. September 5, 1964, 8. Also see Newsweek. September 24, 1964, 21.
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he emphasized the need for a reinvigorated North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
He accused Johnson of making the control of nuclear weapons a "partisan
political issue" and proceeded to restate his position that under crisis
circumstances the Supreme NATO Commander should have authority to use
"small conventional nuclear weapons." Goldwater told the veterans that these
tactical weapons were "no more powerful than the f Ire-power you have faced
on the battlefield."®®® Responding to questions about the recent Democratic
Convention, the senator criticized Johnson's acceptance speech as being
"perhaps the most isolationist ever...Not once did he challenge
Communism."®®’ The Arizonan predicted that Johnson w ould attempt to
capitalize on the war in Vietnam by entering into peace negotiations sometime
before election day. He startled reporters by appearing to soften his position on
Vietnam when he stated that "talks w ith the Red Chinese might be profitable."
Later, in a more characteristically hard line tone, a GOP press aide assured the
reporters that by "talks" w ith China Goldwater actually meant an ultimatum
with possible threats to blow up Chinese bridges if they continued to supply
Viet Cong guerrillas. Newsweek reported that the confused journalists were left
to grope through the candidate's customary "semantic fog."®®®
Goldwater officially began his campaign on September 3, 1964, from his

®®°Goldwater C ollection , W ashington D.C., August 25, 1964, Barrv G oldw ater Campaign
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familiar election launching pad of Prescott, Arizona. Ever cognizant of his
m ilitant image, he promised tranquility abroad and referred to "peace" nearly
twenty times.®®® He proclaimed, "I do not intend to be a wartime president."
The senator lashed out at the President. He renewed his charge that Johnson
would use the Vietnam war to rally voter support during a time of national
crisis. He pledged that if he were elected his conservative principles would be
incorporated into national policy gradually, and that he w ould honor the
country's commitments to social security and other domestic programs.
Referring to foreign affairs, he warned voters, "Choose the way of this present
Administration, you choose the way of unilateral disarmament and
appeasement." By contrast, a Goldwater presidency offered:
Peace through preparedness. Progress through freedom. Purpose through constitutional order.
Peace is basic to the differences between the two parties. Johnson does not comprehend the
nature of the enemy w ho threatens the peace, or the nature of the conflict which...has been
imposed upon the entire world. Some distort that w e are preoccupied with war. There is no
greater political lie. W e are preoccupied with peace. And we are fearful that this Administration
is letting the peace slip away, as it has slipped three time since 1914, by pretending that there
are no threats to it.
This Administration, which inherited the mightiest arsenal for the defense of freedom ever
created on earth, is...dismantling it...Republicans w ill end the draft altogether, and as soon as
possible. To use military services for political and social schemes-as this Administration doesis to drift closer to war on an ebbing tide of military strength. W e have simply got to put this
record straight, and all of us must understand it. The Republican Party is the peace party. W e
seek a strong America because only a strong nation can keep the peace. I do not intend to be a
wartime President. I promise an Administration that w ill keep the peace-and keep faith with
freedom at the same time. The Republican Party, this party of peace through strength, has no
clearer message. Peace has no greater hope.^®'*

®®®Goldwater C ollection, Prescott, AZ, September 3, 1964, Barrv G oldw ater Campaign Speeches
V olum e I. p.1-5. (U.S. N ew & W o rld Report reprinted the entire speech on September 14, 1964).
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Goldwater also promised to end the "outmoded and unfair" military draft
system, which he later claimed "discriminates grossly against many of the poor
and less well-educated."®®® His supporters were energized by the speech,
which appeared to effectively refute all of the negative charges, including the
"trigger happy" label, that had been hung on to their candidate. In his 1988
autobiography, Goldwater referred to the Prescott speech as his "finest
hour."®®® Even the liberal Nation grudgingly backed Goldwater's proposal to
end the draft: "Not even Goldwater can be wrong all the time."®®® But the
magazine's editors remained unconvinced of the Republican's peace overtures
and concluded that "on nuclear weapons alone any sensible voter w ill prefer
Johnson to a thinly disguised jingo like Goldwater."®®®
Two days later, W illiam M iller opened his campaign in New York with a
blistering attack on Hubert Humphrey. M iller challenged the Democrat's Cold
War credentials by charging that Humphrey favored formal recognition of the
People's Republic of China and friendlier relations w ith Castro's Cuba. Senate
Foreign Relations Chairman W illiam Fulbright came to Humphrey's defense
and characterized M iller as being full of "foul-mouthed vituperation." M iller in
turn called Fulbright an "apostle of retreat" and an "advocate of

®®®lbid., p.4. and G oldw ater C ollection, Dallas, TX, September 23, 1964, Barrv G oldw ater
Campaign Speeches Volum e II. p.6.
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accommodation w ho spews forth venomous predictions."®®® Humphrey
ignored M iller's barbs during the campaign and instead swung straight for
Goldwater. He told voters, "The question before the electorate is simple,
prophetic, profound - - which of these men...do you want to have his hand on
the nuclear trigger?"®®®
President Johnson, "filled w ith confidence," opened his campaign on
September 7 in Detroit. He discussed the nation's domestic agenda and
ignored specific policies abroad. He reassured voters that his administration
represented peace, preparedness and prosperity. Johnson purposely avoided
mentioning Goldwater by name, but alluded to the negative image of his
opponent, saying, "This country is not going to turn from unity to hostility,
from understanding to hate."®®’ Like Goldwater's primary election opponents,
the President sought to capitalize on the voters' fears of war. One week later
LBJ attacked "extremists" who "demand that you choose a doctrine alien to
America - - a doctrine that would lead to a tragic convulsion in foreign
relations."®®®
The Democratic strategy to impugn Goldwater was dramatically revealed
in tw o national television advertisements sponsored by the Democratic

” ®Tlm e. September 18, 1964, 32.
®°®lbid., September 25, 1964, 16.
®°’ lbid., September 18, 1964, 30.
®°®lbid.
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National Committee.^®^ The first, broadcast on September 7, depicted a small
girl in a field picking pedals off of a daisy. As the girl counted each pedal, a
man's voice began counting backwards from ten to zero. When the man
reached zero, the scene changed to an explosion of a nuclear bomb and
Johnson's voice was heard saying, "These are the stakes. To make a w orld in
which all of God's children can live, or go into the dark. We must either love
each other, or we must die." An announcer's voice followed to encourage
viewers to vote for Johnson: "The stakes are too high for you to stay
home."^®'’ An equally disturbing second advertisement aired five days later
and targeted Goldwater's 1963 senate vote against the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
The ad pictured another small girl eating an ice cream cone w ith a woman's
voice reminding viewers that radioactive fallout killed children and that if
Goldwater were elected he might restart atmospheric testing. "Vicious?" asked
Time magazine, "O f course. But the very fact that such commercials are being
used speaks mouthfuls about what now stands as the decisive issue of the 1964
presidential campaign - - the argument over control of nuclear weaponry."^®^
In his book The People Machine. Robert MacNeil characterized the advertising

^“^Presidential aide Bill Moyers and the advertising firm Doyle, Dane Bernbach were largely
responsible for the television spots. Goldwater's displeasure over the ads was long lasting. In his
1988 autobiography he noted that even the thought of Moyers still "makes me sick."
^"‘‘Bernard Rubin, Political Television (Belmont. CA, 1967), 186.
^°^Time. September 25, 1964, 16. Interviewed for the 1988 Goldwater autobiography, the
Washington Post's Ben Brad lee recalled his impression of the advertisements, they were "a fucking
outrage. I was outraged."
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campaign as a "viciously clever attempt to keep alive doubts that had been an
issue all year, of Goldwater's trust worthiness w ith the nation's nuclear
arsenal."^®® MacNeil called the television spots "scurrilous," but also credited
a host of Goldwater's Republican and Democratic critics w ith the formation of
his image as a "trigger-happy cowboy...ready to 'shoot from the hip'."^®^
The tw o Democratic television advertisements were broadcasted once and
each lasted less than five minutes, but they effectively repelled Goldwater's
early attempt to capture or at least control the peace issue. The advertisement's
striking visuals tied the specter of nuclear holocaust to a Goldwater presidency.
The ads sparked press inquiry over the genesis of the war-peace issue and
resulted in harsh criticism o f both candidates. Time attacked Johnson for not
acknowledging that U.S. defense policy since the Eisenhower administration
had provided nuclear weapons authority to the Supreme NATO Commander
under certain circumstances. The magazine blasted Goldwater for his
"appalling ignorance" surrounding the ramifications of limited nuclear
engagements and for downplaying the tremendously destructive impact of
tactical nuclear weapons.^®® Despite his early attempts to control the warpeace issue, Goldwater had been quickly relegated to his familiar defensive
posture on the most controversial issue o f the campaign. This was a perilous

^““Robert MacNeil, The People Machine: The Influence of Television on American Politics (New
York, 1968), 205.
“ 'Ibid.

“ “Time. September 25, 1964, 15-19.
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position for an underdog candidate attempting to depose a powerful
incumbent.
Campaigning on the west coast, Goldwater discussed domestic issues
including a call for a twenty-five percent reduction in income taxes over a fiveyear period. He also railed against corruption in the nation's capital and against
urban crime, but he kept foreign affairs in the forefront by declaring
communism "the only substantial threat to the peace in the entire w orld" and
by attacking the Kennedy administration's Cuba policy and linking it to Johnson
and the war in Vietnam:
The Bay of Pigs was a shock and a shame...the [Cuban] missile crisis?...it proved that an
Administration which long had planned on the basis that the Soviet never would move missiles
into this hemisphere, was dead and dangerously wrong.
And it proved that despite weeks, and months, of warning about the missiles, an Administration
totally political in its goals and instincts could and would wait until the perilous last moment to
take action...at a time that would have maximum domestic political impact...[this] offers a
future warning.
Americans must be prepared under such an Administration to be faced by crisis of some sort
just before an election.
What w ill it be this time? Was the so-called crisis in the Gulf of Tonkin a hint of things to
come? It should be a warning as well.
The peace of the world may be dying there, along with respect for America, which is an
important part of our ability to keep the peace. Vietnam, however, to hear this Administration
talk, is not an issue...this Administration w on't admit that what it has on its hand is a war.
Beyond that, its leader won't admit that Communism is the cause of that war...And you w ill
reject the men who talk of peace but lack the strength to keep it.“ ®

Throughout much of September, Goldwater clung to Vietnam as a major
stump issue. He referred to it as "Lyndon Johnson's War" and characterized

“ “Goldwater Collection, Seattle, Washington, September 9, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign
Speeches Volume II. p.4-6.
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U.S. policy as weak, indecisive, and directionless.^’® He devoted two
speeches almost exclusively to Vietnam. First in Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, he claimed that the Johnson administration had been "struck deaf,
dumb and blind by the mounting crisis in Vietnam...a war in which Americans
are dying."“” Goldwater demanded that the administration inform the public
about w hy the U.S. m ilitary was in Southeast Asia and what its objectives
were. Ten days later w hile campaigning in Louisville, Kentucky, the senator
charged the Democratic Party w ith administering a foreign policy of unwitting
appeasement that had resulted in three wars during the twentieth century. He
began referring to Johnson as "the interim President" and claimed that the
Vietnam War was a result of LBJ's weak and confusing leadership. The senator
asked his audiences if there had ever been "a more mishandled conflict in
American history than Lyndon Johnson's war in Asia."“ '
In response to his opponent's attack, the President unveiled his oft
repeated peace theme by pledging to "go to any remote corner of the w orld to
meet anyone, any time, to promote freedom and to promote peace."“ ^
Johnson did not talk much about Vietnam specifically, but when he did, he

“'“Goldwater Collection, Louisville, KY, September 25, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign
Speeches Volume II. p.2.
“"Goldwater Collection, Winston-Salem, N.C., September 15,1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign
Speeches Volume II. p.l.
“' “Goldwater Collection, Louisville, KY, September 25, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign
Speeches Volume II. p.l.
“' “Goldman, The Tragedy Of Lvndon lohnson. 224.
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promised to maintain the anti-communist position established by his
predecessors w ithout enlarging the war. The President warned that a military
escalation would, "result in our committing a good many American boys to
fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help
protect their own land."“’‘’
During a fourteen-city tour of the South, Goldwater emphasized the
domestic themes he had honed during his years as the Senate reelection
chairman. He denounced corruption, violence, welfare, and the large federal
government as products of political liberalism. In Florida, Oklahoma, Arkansas
and Texas, his speeches became more reassuring and cautious and cited the
importance of "national unity, the good life, peace and nuclear
responsibility."®’ ^ His ongoing attempt to control the peace issue was clearly
evident by his new critique of those who supported unlim ited bombing of
North Vietnam, and he promised not to frighten others into W orld War III.
Journalists reported on Goldwater's "warm reception" in the South and
frequently noted that he was routinely outdrawing the touring rock-and-roll
band. The Beatles.
On September 18, Goldwater delivered a thirty minute national television
speech addressing the importance of foreign policy in the election. He
criticized Johnson for refusing to "speak plainly" on international affairs and

®’"lb id ., 234-35.
® "M cD o w e ll, Campaign Fever. 175.
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declared that "weakness and indecision and appeasement" in presidential
leadership risked full scale war. Goldwater declared " I want no part of w ar"
and that "I do not intend to be a wartime President...I know its ravages, its
horror, its destruction." As he would do often during the campaign, Goldwater
compared his warmonger image to that of Prime Minister Winston Churchill
who had the courage to challenge Britain's appeasement policy in 1938. He
characterized communism as a school yard bully and demanded that the
United States "Just stand up to him...just draw the line on his aggression...he'll
back down." In response to charges that he had concentrated too much on
foreign affairs during the campaign, Goldwater said, "I do not apologize for
this-l insist upon it....If my opponents choose to misconstrue my words and my
concern, for their own short-range political gain-then so be it...these things are
far more important and of infinitely more value than the political fortune of any
man seeking high office."®’ ® During the next week, Goldwater described
Johnson's conduct of foreign relations as "dream world diplomacy" that
encouraged communist aggression, and he renewed his demand for a
presidential debate to highlight the candidates' differences in "the major issue
in this campaign," foreign policy leadership.®’ '
September polling data confirmed Goldwater's belief that war and peace

“’“Goldwater Collection, Nationwide Television Address, September 18, 1964, Barrv Goldwater
Campaign Speeches Volume II. p. 1-8.
“’'Goldwater Collection, Midland-Odessa, TX, September 22, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign
Speeches Volume II. p. 1-6.
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had become the number one campaign issue.®’® But despite the Arizonan's
stalwart campaigning, Newsweek reported that Johnson still maintained a 30
point lead in national polls and that he had made crucial gains in the South
where the candidates were now running neck-in-neck.®’ “
On September 28, Goldwater began a five day, thirty-three city, train tour
through the upper Midwest, including stops in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. In
Athens, Ohio, he reiterated the need for m ilitary strength during a time of
peace and claimed, "The surest way to get into a war in this w orld is to
become a weak country....read your history...every time we go to war the
Democrats are in power." Later w hile in Chillicothe, Ohio, Goldwater repeated
his attack on Johnson for not debating the issues, saying the President was
"never around the W hite House enough to find him. If Khrushchev calls on that
hot line, some beagle is going to answer." In Cincinnati, w ith fiery rhetoric, he
accused the administration of being "soft on Communism" w ith a foreign policy
of "drift, deception and defeat." He complained that Johnson refused to debate
foreign relations because it was politically risky. Regarding Vietnam, the
Republican asked "Why does he put off facing the question of what to do
about Vietnam? Does he hope that he can wait until after the election to
confront the American public w ith the facts of total defeat or total war in

“' “Time. September 25, 1964, 15-19.
“ '“ Newsweek. September, 28, 1964, 25-26.
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Asia?"®“° As if reminded of his militant image w hile in Columbus, Goldwater
warned o f the dangers of a prolonged war in Vietnam and omitted his frequent
call for "victory"; instead, he declared "I am a peacemonger" and called for an
end to the conflict and stated that there was no easy solution.®®’
In Crown Point-Hammond, Indiana, Goldwater compared the current
election to that of 1952, when "the basic issue was to pick a man who could
best protect our peace and security." W hile he drew several valid comparisons
to the previous election, including the dangers of nuclear proliferation and land
wars in Asia, the Republican's militant rhetoric was hardly reassuring: "The real
question in this campaign is not w ho is 'trigger happy' or w ho w ill 'press the
button'...The United States w ill never start any war...In all likelihood, the
President...and the Vice-President would not be around at all to push the
button. It w ould be too late for button-pushing...if they ever should push the
button, we w ould destroy them."®®®
During September and October, large and receptive crowds greeted
President Johnson across New England and the Midwest and in large southern
cities. The size and enthusiasm of his audiences seemed to reinforce polls
forecasting a Democratic victory of massive proportions. Johnson, a master

“““G oldw ater C ollection, C incinnati, O H , September 29, 1964, Barrv G oldw ater Campaign
Speeches V o lum e II. p . l, 5.
““ ’ M c D o w e ll, Campaign Fever. 186, 189, 193, 195.
“““G oldw ater C ollection, Crown Point-Hamm ond,
Campaign Speeches V olum e III, p. 1-5.

IN, O ctober 1, 1964, Barrv G oldw ater
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politician, left nothing to chance. He campaigned vigorously, frequently
assailing his opponent. He referred to Goldwater as a "raving, ranting
demagogue" and told his followers that "I admire a brave man, but some
people have more guts than brains."®®®
Goldwater continued to crisscross the nation w ith stops in New Jersey,
Texas, California and Utah. On October 6, he stressed that the relevance of the
Cold War to the election saying, "This is a live issue, a real issue, and a deeply
significant issue." He condemned Johnson for his "fraudulent attack" regarding
NATO's control of nuclear weapons, and he told voters that they had a choice
between "reacting to Communism...or seeking initiatives."®®“ Three days later,
the Republican nominee received badly needed support from Richard Nixon,
who during a television address defended Goldwater's position on NATO's
control of nuclear weapons as a policy that was started by Eisenhower and
continued by President Kennedy.®®® Nixon called upon Johnson to apologize
to the senator, who Nixon described as "a reasonable...calm...patriotic
man."®®® Goldwater also received the support of President Eisenhower, who
delivered a foreign policy speech in Columbus, Ohio. Ike expressed his

“““G oldm an, The Traaedv O f Lvndon lohnson. 229, 234.
““'‘G oldw ater C ollection, W ashington, D.C., O ctober 6, 1964, Barrv G oldw ater Campaign
Speeches V olum e 111, p .6-7.
“““Ambrose, N ixon vol. II, 47-58.
“““ G oldw ater C ollection, Richard M . N ixon National Television Address, O ctober 9 ,1 9 6 4 , Barrv
G oldw ater Campaign Speeches V olum e III, p.4.
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concern for the "harsh problems of national security" and asked voters to be
"immune to the techniques of promise-peddling and panic-mongering." He
described the Democratic Party's charges of Republican extremism as "Tommy
Rot!"®®' In an attempt to revive a foreign policy strategy reminiscent of the
1952 presidential election, Goldwater promised to send Eisenhower to
Southeast Asia to help design a more effective policy. He stated that the U.S.
would never engage in nuclear warfare w ith the Soviet Union; "neither of us
would be that stupid."®®®
An October New York Times survey indicated that Johnson held
commanding leads in seventeen states w ith another fourteen "leaning."®®®
Goldwater supposedly held two states w ith eight leaning, thus leaving nine
states uncommitted. But the Johnson campaign was gathering momentum in
the Midwest and, "The oftener Senator Goldwater used his hard line about
'victory' over Communism, the oftener the President spoke of prudence."®®®
Three weeks before election day, the weary Goldwater staff received a
momentary boost. Despite efforts by the W hite House to suppress the story,
news spread that a long time Johnson adviser and confidant, Walter Jenkins,
had been arrested in Washington for homosexual activity in a public facility.

““'G o ld w a te r C ollection, Eisenhower Speech in Columbus, O H , O ctober 12, 1964, Barrv
G oldw ater Campaign Speeches V olum e III, p.2, 6.
“““ New York Times. O ctober 13, 1964.
“““ Ibid., O ctober 6, 1964.
“““M cD o w e ll, Campaign Fever. 207.
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Goldwater resisted the temptation to comment on the Jenkins affair specifically.
He had however been speaking out against the country's decaying morality
under Democratic leadership, and the Jenkins arrest allowed him to establish a
link between mores and the W hite House.®®’ Unfortunately for the
Republicans, turbulent w orld affairs quickly overshadowed the Jenkins case and
renewed the specter of nuclear war.
On October 15, Nikita Khrushchev fell from power in the Soviet Union,
and on the follow ing day, the People's Republic of China exploded its first
nuclear bomb. These events seized the country's attention and presented the
candidates w ith the opportunity to demonstrate leadership during a time of
international crisis. In a prime time television address, Johnson delivered "one
of the most effective speeches politically of recent time."®®® The President,
who had recently decided to emphasize foreign policy in the campaign,
appeared firm against communism but resolute in keeping peace. He
acknowledged concern for the "dangerous communists" w ho had threatened
war in Cuba and Berlin, but he also referred to their "good sense and sober
judgement" in support of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In response to China's
nuclear achievement, Johnson reaffirmed the United State's "defense
commitments in Asia," warned against nuclear proliferation, and called on
China to sign the test ban treaty. America's objective, he said, is "peace for all

““’ G oldw ater refused to broadcast an anti-Johnson film depicting the decline in the nation's
m orality. See his book G oldwater. 260.
“““M cD o w e ll, Campaign Fever. 209.
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men."®®® Johnson aide Eric F. Goldman commented that the President "strove
to sound like, what he wanted so much to be, the wise, benevolent father to
the nation."®®'’
In a televised speech entitled "Soviet Shift And U.S. Policy," Goldwater
responded to the w orld events on October 21. He warned the nation that the
international situation reflected ever increasing dangers; "the Communist threat
to our security has become more grave." He foresaw Sino-Soviet
rapprochement as a shift toward "a more unified Communist movement."
Referencing Khrushchev's 1957 cry to "bury us" three times, he attacked the
administration's belief in "good" and "bad" communists and called Johnson's
foreign policy an "utter failure." The simplicity of the senator's outlook was
reflected in his discussion o f Sino-Soviet rapprochement: "They were quarreling
over who w ould be the big boss of the entire Communist movement and what
would be the best way to bury us...[Johnson's] mistake o f trying to distinguish
different kinds of Communism...ignored the fact that all Communist agree on
the same goal...a Communist dominated w orld." Goldwater offered three
foreign policy solutions: rebuild NATO; recognize communism as our enemy;
and confront it w ith a "firm policy of resistance." His message had remained
consistent, one of peace through demonstrative strength. He closed the speech

®“®Arthur Schlesineer. Ir.. H istorv o f Am erican Presidential Elections. 1789-1968. iV:3691, 369394.
““'’G oldm an, The Tragedy O f Lvndon lohnson. 253.
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by promising "I w ill lead you back to sanity in our foreign relations."®®®
The Arizonan traveled extensively during the last weeks of the campaign.
W ith a few exceptions the campaign ended much like it had started in New
Hampshire, w ith speeches to crowds in small towns such as Lewistown,
Huntingdon and Altoona, Pennsylvania. On some occasions his enthusiasm
had diminished, leading reporter Charles McDowell to comment that he dealt
w ith crowds "like a man keeping appointments w ith strangers." This was in
stark contrast with Johnson, who "charged at them, embraced them, cajoled
and lectured them."®®® In late October Johnson began to tell his crowds, "It
just w on 't do for my opponent and Red China to have atomic bombs at the
same time."®®' Despite a consensus among pollsters that Johnson w ould win
in a landslide, Goldwater still predicted a Republican victory predicated upon
the wishes of a majority of conservative voters who agreed w ith him on the
essential issues.®®® During an October 31 stop in Las Vegas, reporters noted
that local handicappers made Goldwater an eight to one underdog to w in the
election.
Barry Goldwater made his final appeal from San Francisco on November

®®®Goldwater C ollection, National Television Address, O ctober 21, 1964, Barrv G oldw ater
Campaign Speeches V olum e III, p. 1-9.
“““M cD o w e ll, Campaign Fever. 230.
““'G oldm an, The Tragedv O f Lvndon lohnson. 252.
“““O n O ctober 27, 1964, actor Ronald W . Reagan gave a th irty m inute televised speech called
"A Tim e For Choosing." M any observers, including G oldwater, considered the oratory the best
speech given in the entire campaign. See G oldwater. 266.
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2. As a demonstration of his honesty and clarity of vision, he delivered the
identical speech that he had given in Prescott two months earlier. He ended
with a final promise, "no matter the cost...I w ill give you an honest
Administration...I w ill tell you the truth."®®® Voters went to the polls the next
day and provided Lyndon Johnson one of the most decisive presidential
victories in American history. The New York Times headline read: "JOHNSON
SWAMPS GOLDWATER."®'’® The Democrat received 43.1 m illion popular
votes and 486 electoral votes compared to 27.1 m illion popular and 52
electoral votes for Goldwater. The maverick senator had managed victories in
only six states: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina,
and Arizona - - the latter by less than 5,000 votes.
Three major factors had contributed to Lyndon Johnson's sweeping
victory. The first was related to the nation's political and economic
circumstances. Campaigns for the presidency had begun in earnest w ithin just
months of the tragic Kennedy assassination and voters responded favorably to
Johnson's unifying leadership. The incumbent also benefitted from America's
domestic prosperity as the economy expanded by nearly 13 percent from 1962
to 1964. Johnson's election success was also dependent on his political
expertise. Throughout 1964 he drew upon his vast congressional experience
and championed popular legislation. Furthermore, as a veteran o f countless

“““G oldw ater C ollection, San Francisco, CA, N ovem ber 2, 1964, Barrv G oldw ater Campaign
Speeches V olum e 111, p.8.
340

N ew York Times. September 4, 1964.
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reelection campaigns, he implemented a flawless election strategy designed to
contrast his inclusive domestic agenda and cautious foreign policy to the
"extremist" ideology of his opponent. The final major element of LBJ's election
victory was related to Goldwater inability to reverse or at least control his
image as a warmonger. The nation's prosperity had overshadowed the vitality
of the senator's crusade against big government, and w hile his concern for
corruption in Washington and declining morality did resonate w ith many
voters, the critical issue of leadership in defense and foreign relations doomed
his bid for the W hite House.
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EPILOGUE

Domestic well-being has been a preeminent concern of most American
voters, but W orld War II and the ensuing war against communism abroad
increased the general importance of foreign policy considerations in American
presidential elections. By the mid-1960s, nearly two decades after the origin of
the Cold War, anti-communist ideology continued to dominate foreign affairs
issues in presidential politics. Excluding third party candidate Henry Wallace,
every major presidential nominee advocated the militant containment of
international communism. In 1948 and 1956, when national elections
coincided w ith international crises, voters rallied behind their incumbent
presidents. Under these circumstances, the opposing major party candidates
were reluctant to seriously challenge the incumbent on foreign relations
because it was politically infeasible, and because they shared the presidents'
anti-communist perspective. There were two post-World W ar II elections that
did not involve incumbent candidates. First in 1952, when the final decisive
issue of the campaign became the Korean War, a majority o f voters backed a
proven foreign affairs leader. General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Then in 1960,
when neither candidate displayed a clear leadership advantage in foreign
relations, voters were deeply divided, contributing to an extremely close
157
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election.
Although these four postwar elections possessed some unique foreign
policy issues, each major party candidate actively supported the crux of the
containment strategy. The role of foreign affairs leadership as a decisive issue in
presidential elections had two primary considerations for voters. The candidates
needed to offer an appropriate balance between a willingness to use military
force against the spread of communism and the prudent judgement necessary
to decide when that force was justified. From 1948 to 1964, voters never
doubted the various candidates' willingness to wage the Cold War; therefore,
the issue of prudent judgement became the more important factor. This foreign
policy benchmark was most evident in the 1964 presidential election.
In January 1964, Republican Barry Goldwater officially announced his
candidacy for president because no other candidate advocated more vigorous
action against communism abroad and a smaller federal government at home.
His staunch political convictions were derived from his experience as a
successful businessman, military officer, and civic leader. Arizona voters had
rewarded Goldwater's outspoken support of conservative principles by electing
him their U.S. senator in 1952 and 1958. W hile in Congress, his unyielding
faith in conservatism set him apart from his peers, and by his own admission,
he labored in the minority wing of the minority party. Although generally
supportive of GOP initiatives, Goldwater did not hesitate to condemn fellow
Republicans for supporting liberal causes. His activities on several prominent
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Senate committees gained him national recognition as a leader of the
burgeoning conservative movement, and by 1963, he had become a legitimate
candidate for the Republican presidential nomination. The Arizonan captured
the nomination in Kennedy-like manner by cultivating party delegates long
before the national convention. But Goldwater's path to the nomination proved
more difficult as liberal and moderate Republican's stubbornly resisted his
unswerving positions on domestic and foreign affairs. No previous candidate's
bid for the W hite House fared so badly at the hands of his own party.
Notwithstanding the GOP infighting, Lyndon Johnson would have
defeated any opposing nominee in the 1964 election as he benefitted from the
immense advantages of an incumbent seeking reelection. Like Eisenhower eight
years earlier, LBJ led the nation during a time of general economic prosperity
and he had demonstrated an acceptable balance of force and restraint in the
Cold War. A brilliant politician and campaigner, the Texan also benefitted from
the unique atmosphere of national sympathy and unity that followed the
assassination of a w idely popular president. A review of polling data
throughout 1964 indicates that Johnson's ability to win the presidency in his
own right was never in serious Jeopardy.®'” Even Goldwater later admitted
that he would have lost the election "even if Abraham Lincoln had come back
and campaigned with us."®"® Nonetheless, a Democratic landslide was not

®'” Bruce E. Altschuler, LBI and the Polls (Gainesville, FL: 1990), 1-16.
®'’“ Barry M . G oldw ater and Jack Casserly, G oldw ater (New York, 1988), 144.
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inevitable. Johnson's spectacular margin of victory was in large part derived
from the public's decisive perception of Goldwater as an impulsive radical who
wanted to end federal programs such as social security and w ho would
senselessly risk nuclear confrontation in the Cold War.
New York governor Nelson Rockefeller had initiated the assault on
Goldwater during the 1964 Republican primary elections. His strategy was to
dramatize the Arizonan's image as a fringe candidate, w ho only possessed the
marginal support of right wing radicals. He characterized the senator as a
militant cowboy from a sparsely populated Western state whose domestic
policies were outdated and whose foreign policies were dangerous. During the
primaries. Rockefeller and other Republicans convinced many voters that a
Goldwater presidency would lead to full scale war in Vietnam and possibly
nuclear confrontation w ith the People's Republic of China or the Soviet Union.
Barry Goldwater's image as a fervent anti-communist was not a caricature
created solely by political opponents. As a U.S. senator, Goldwater had
developed, documented and campaigned for a brinkmanship-like diplomacy
that became synonymous w ith his presidential candidacy. When he emerged as
a legitimate candidate, he could not retreat from his zealous militancy, nor did
he wish to. The product of an authentic grass roots movement, Goldwater
organized and ran for the presidency strictly on his own terms w ith an
uncompromising dedication to his conservative ideology. Johnson aide George
Reedy had characterized the Republican's 1964 campaign as a "sacred
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mission."®"®
During the preceding presidential election, Nixon's and Kennedy's foreign
policy platforms had been almost indistinguishable. Each called for victory in
the Cold War and accused the other of being impulsive and trigger-happy, but
neither convinced the public that his opponent would implement a particularly
dangerous or risky foreign policy. The 1960 election proved to be one o f the
closest contests in the history of presidential politics. By contrast, four years
later only one candidate demanded victory over communism, and he alone
was accused of being impulsive and trigger-happy. The 1962 Cuban missile
crisis had demonstrated the frightening consequences of atomic diplomacy, and
American voters came to fear Goldwater's continued advocacy of nuclear
brinkmanship.
As early as October 1963, even before Kennedy's assassination, political
pundits had forecast that war and peace w ould be the key issue during the
1964 presidential election and after his nomination in San Francisco,
Goldwater admitted to GOP leaders that his negative image regarding foreign
affairs had become his "number one problem."®"" Consequently, the senator's
campaign speeches were designed to clarify his peace through strength
position. By September, polling data confirmed that leadership in foreign affairs

®"®lbid., 160.
“""G oldw ater Speech, Hershey, Pennsylvania, August 12, 1964, Barrv G oldw ater Campaign
Speeches V olum e I. p.2, Barry M . G oldw ater C ollection, A rizona H istorical Foundation, Tempe,
Arizona.
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had become the most important issue to voters. But, the issue of foreign policy
was like quicksand to Goldwater, and the more he worked to reverse his
image, the worse it seemed to become. When asked three weeks before the
election what had been the most damaging issue during the campaign, he cited
"the repetition of the outright lie...'the trigger-happy'...'nuclear thing'." The
1964 election ended in one of the most decisive defeats ever. Ironically,
Johnson, as the peace candidate, was unbeatable in 1964, but his militant
policy in Vietnam ruined his chances for reelection four years later.
In the context of U.S. presidential politics, Barry Goldwater w ill be
remembered first for the striking margin of his defeat in the 1964 election.
However, the potentially greater significance of his candidacy may lie in the
many influential precedents set by his campaign. Goldwater was the first
modern conservative to w in a major party nomination, and his campaign
broadened national support for conservative policies and weakened Democratic
dominance in the Deep South. The Arizonan's grass roots popularity led to a
breadth of campaign contributors that surpassed any other previous presidential
candidate. His campaign also established new and lasting issues of morality,
urban crime and nuclear weapons policy. And w hile many observers
interpreted Goldwater's loss as a devastating defeat for Republicans, during the
course of future elections the party reaped many benefits from the popular
conservative movement in 1964. The Republicans went on to w in the
presidency in 1968 and 1972, and only four elections after Goldwater's run.
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w ith a more polished and tim ely nominee, GOP conservatives captured the
W hite House on an all too familiar platform calling for an end to big
government and for the defeat of international communism.
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